

Feature Article 【專題論文】

Maintaining Boundaries:  
The Military and Civil Branches in the Koryŏ  
and Early Chosŏn  
高麗時代與朝鮮時代初期文武的分途

John DUNCAN\*

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\* Professor of Asian Languages & Cultures, UCLA.

## Abstract

This article examines the tradition of civil supremacy and the tensions that existed between the civil and military branches of the government in the Koryŏ and Chosŏn periods. It notes that the distinctions between the civil and military branches were not just political, but also social, except during tenth century Koryŏ and an extended period of time in the late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn when there was relative equality between the two branches and when the social barriers between the two branches broke down. It examines the processes by which the superiority of the civil branch was established and suggests that practical considerations of dynastic security were equally as important as Confucian ideology in the elevation of the civil branch.

## 摘要

本文檢視高麗與朝鮮時代文人至上的傳統，以及存在於政府文武部門之間的張力。本文指出除了十世紀高麗時代、以及在高麗晚期與朝鮮初期的長時間，文武部門之間相對平等，且兩部門間的社會藩籬瓦解以外，文武部門之間的區別不只是政治性，也是社會性的。本文檢視文部門確立優勢的過程，並且提出在文部門的提升上，動態安全的實際考量與儒家思想同等重要的看法。

## I. Introduction

Historians and other scholars have a tendency to describe historical East Asia, particularly China and Korea, as "Confucian" societies and then to explain various aspects of those historical (and even modern) societies as products of the influence of Confucianism. Not only does this approach tend to dismiss non-Confucian systems of thought such as Legalism that played important roles in East Asian politics but it also entails the danger of devolving into idealist tautology. It also ignores the specific political, social, and economic considerations that conditioned the ways Confucianism was understood and used by various social actors in different locales and different times throughout history. Most troublesome to me is that this approach essentializes East Asia as something qualitatively different from the West.<sup>1</sup>

One area in which we tend to highlight the "Confucian" distinctiveness of China and Korea is the historical prevalence of civil supremacy in those two countries. We note the early establishment of civil service examinations, of the structural superiority—in terms of official ranks—of the civil branch of government and in way in which those two countries rarely, if ever, invaded their neighbors. This is all attributed to Confucian doctrine, but such interpretations tend to elide such things as the existence of military service examinations in China and Korea,<sup>2</sup> the theoretical parity of the civil and military branches of the

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1 To give a simple example of the problems here, scholars routinely attribute the patriarchal family of East Asia to the influence of Confucianism. If so, how are we to explain the patriarchal social order of the early modern and modern West? As the product of Christianity? In recent years, the view that the rise of patriarchy in early modern Europe was closely related to the development of absolutist monarchies has become dominant in the field of European history. See, for example, Natalie Zemon Davis, *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978) and Lynn Hunt, *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). It seems to me that an exploration of the rise of patriarchy in Chosŏn era Korea might benefit from a similar inquiry.

2 For recent scholarship critical of the notion that Chinese culture systematically deprecated the military, see Nicola Di Cosmo (ed.), *Military Culture in Imperial China* (Cambridge, Mass.:

government, and the ways in which such putatively "Confucian" Chinese states as the Han, the Sui, and the Tang aggressively expanded their territory by waging wars of conquest against neighboring peoples. It seems to me that rather than simply assuming civil supremacy, it might be more fruitful to examine the tensions that arose in a system that seemed to give priority to civil officials while maintaining the fiction that the civil and military were equal branches of the government.

Korea would seem to be an excellent case to argue that Confucianism produced civil supremacy. It is generally recognized that both the Koryŏ and Chosŏn dynasties pursued policies of civil supremacy, and that they organized their officials into two separate branches, civil and military. It is also well-known that the military branch occupied an inferior position. The ranks of its top officials were four (Koryŏ) or three (Chosŏn) grades lower than the highest ranks of the officials of the civil branch and, while officials of military branch origins were occasionally given appointments to mid-level posts in the civil branch, they were not allowed, with a few rare exceptions, to hold the first and second grade civil posts where genuine political power resided. Furthermore, it was routine practice to give supreme command of military forces in the field to high-ranking civil officials. All of this would suggest that Korea was an example, par excellence, of Confucian civil supremacy.

What is less well known, except to specialists in pre-modern Korean history, is that both the early Koryŏ and the late Chosŏn had informal but relatively strict systems of social segregation between the two branches that promoted the development of hereditary lines of military and civil officials. In between the early Koryŏ and the late Chosŏn was a period of approximately three centuries beginning with the military coup of 1170 and ending sometime around the end of the fifteenth or beginning of the sixteenth century when the practice of

discrimination against the military branch waned, when men of military branch origins frequently rose to the highest posts in the civil branch, and when the distinctions between civil and military lines of descent faded away.

There has been a fair amount of scholarship, in both Korean and English, on relations between civil and military officials before and during the period of military rule in the mid-Koryŏ which lasted from the 1170 military coup to the supposed restoration of power to throne and the civil bureaucracy in 1258. On the other hand, although scholars often note the political importance of military men in the final decades of the Koryŏ period, there has been almost no research on the civil and military branches during the final century and a half of the Koryŏ and very little substantial research on that issue for the first century or so of the Chosŏn period. In this paper, I will first engage in a re-examination of civil—military relations in the early and mid-Koryŏ, with a focus on the process by which distinctions were established between the two branches. I will then seek to shed light on relations between the civil and military during the late Koryŏ—early Chosŏn era before finally indulging in a preliminary inquiry into the process by which boundaries between the two branches were re-established in fifteenth and early sixteenth century Chosŏn. In doing so, I will argue, not unlike political science realists, that regime (or dynastic) security was the primary reason for civil supremacy and suggest that Confucianism was less a source of such supremacy than a way to legitimize a system that sought to keep the military from challenging dynastic authority.

## II. Civil and Military in the Early and Mid-Koryŏ

There is nothing in the sources to suggest any sort of meaningful distinction between military and civil officials in the pre-Koryŏ period. The Three Kingdoms period (early centuries c.e.-668) was an era of almost incessant warfare. Although

the *Samguk sagi* and other sources indicate the existence of aristocratic councils (Koguryŏ's *Chega hoeŭi*, Silla's *Hwabaek*, and Paekche's *Chŏngsaam*), the members of those councils appear to have been largely military aristocrats. Even during the years of prolonged peace during the later (unified) Silla period (668-935), when the kingdom established a central military system (the *sŏdang/chŏng* system) and remodeled many of its institutions along Tang lines, there was no formal differentiation between civil and military branches of service. This was perhaps due to the persistence of the Bone Rank caste system, but this issue deserves further investigation.

The transition from later Silla to the Koryŏ (the Later Three Kingdoms period, 892-936) was an era of military ascendancy when local warlords and disaffected Silla aristocrats, each with their own substantial military forces, struggled for control of the peninsula. The eventual winner, Koryŏ, was essentially an alliance of military strongmen whose king, Wang Kŏn, was little more than first among equals who presided over a military council, the *Sun'gun-bu*, that made major policy decisions. The stranglehold of the military confederation was eventually broken by King Kwangjong (949-975), who implemented a number of reforms curbing the power of the strongmen before eventually eliminating them in a series of violent purges during the final years of his reign. For the purposes of this paper, Kwangjong's most important reform was the introduction of a civil service examination system in 958. Although there had been a handful of Confucian literati, men who had studied in the Tang and returned to Korea around the time of the fall of that Chinese dynasty, holding offices that required literary skills in the early decades of the Koryŏ, the implementation of civil service examinations was the first major step towards distinguishing between officials of civil and military origins.

The formal organization of the officialdom into separate civil and military branches came during the reign of King Sŏngjong (981-997) as part of a major

restructuring of institutions modeled after those of the Tang and Song.<sup>3</sup> Not only were the two branches clearly separated, but the military branch held a structurally inferior position, as was the case in Tang China. The bureaucracy had an eighteen grade system (from Senior First Grade to Junior Ninth Grade), but whereas civil officials could hold grades up to the very highest Senior First Grade,<sup>4</sup> the highest rank in the military branch was the Senior Third grade.<sup>5</sup> It also seems likely that the practice of having high-ranking civil officials assume command of military forces in the field began at this time, as seen in the case of Sō Hūi (942-998), a civil service examination graduate and senior civil official who was field marshal of the troops sent forth against a Qidan invasion in 993.

This did not mean that the military branch passively accepted its inferior position. There were two instances in the early eleventh century in which military officials sought to reestablish military political power. This can be seen in the affair of Kang Cho (974-910), a general who forced King Mokchong (997-1009) to step down in favor of King Hyōnjong (1009-1130) and dominated politics in the capital until he was captured and killed by Qidan invaders in 1010. Shortly thereafter, in 1014, there was a coup led by two military officials, Kim Hun and Ch'oe Chil, who were unhappy because of the loss of certain prebends and because military officials were prohibited from holding offices in the civil branch.<sup>6</sup> Although Kim and Ch'oe enjoyed initial success and forced the king to allow the appointment of military officials to civil offices, they were arrested and executed in 1016. That marked the end of active military resistance. Although the discrimination against the military began with Kwangjong's purges and was

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3 It is not clear in which year the two branch system was introduced. There is some evidence that it was in or before 986, but some scholars argue that it didn't happen until 995. See Pyōn T'aesōp, *Koryō chōngch'i chedosa yōn'gu* (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1974). It seems likely that the system was phased in over several years, possibly because of resistance on the part of military men.

4 The Senior First Grade rank was reserved for honorary appointments; the highest active officials held the Junior First Grade.

5 The limitation of Senior Third Grade for military officials followed the Tang system implemented during the reign of Gaozong (649-683).

6 Pyōn T'aesōp, *Koryō chōngch'i chedosa yōn'gu*, pp. 294-295.

institutionalized by Sŏngjong's adoption of the Tang model, it seems likely that the events of the early eleventh century had much to do with the strict separation of the two branches that developed over the ensuing century and a half.

The distinctions between the two branches were not limited to the career paths available to men once they entered official service. By the second half of the eleventh century, there emerged hereditary lines of civil and military officials. The civil officials belonged to such well-known descent groups as the Kyŏngwŏn (Ich'ŏn), Yi, the Haeju Ch'oe, the Kyŏngju Kim, the Kangnŭng Kim, and the P'yŏngsan Yu and were almost all the descendants of men who first entered the officialdom via the civil service examinations. Because of the way in which the histories and other sources favored civil over military officials, it is difficult to identify military descent groups, although the Ubong Ch'oe of Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn (1149-1219) certainly appears to be such a case. Scholars have also identified separate hereditary lines of military officials within such prominent descent groups as the Kyŏngwŏn Yi, the Kangnŭng Kim, and the P'yŏngsan Yu,<sup>7</sup> but military officials from those descent groups are not known to have held civil offices (with one noteworthy exception who will be discussed later). This development of distinct civil and military lineages took place within a society where ascriptive privilege was prevalent, not only among the newly emerging central descent groups but also out in the countryside where local administration remained in the hands of the descendants, now known as *hyangni* (Ch. *xiangli*), of the local warlords of the Silla-Koryŏ transition. This suggests that, the apparent Koryŏ fidelity to Chinese political institutions notwithstanding, Korean society was structured on lines more similar to those of contemporary Japan than of Tang or Song China.<sup>8</sup>

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7 John B. Duncan, *The Origins of the Chosŏn Dynasty* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), p. 58.

8 An interesting sub issue here is why Koryŏ did not devolve into something similar to the *bakufu* system of Japan. Clearly the potential was there. Although later Silla had a comprehensive and fairly regular system of local administration in which nearly all prefectures and counties were supervised by centrally appointed magistrates, the Koryŏ had a very loose system of control

By the end of the eleventh century, the great civil aristocratic groups came to dominate the royal family and began to struggle among themselves for power. The first eruption came in 1094, when Yi Chaŭi (?-1095), a scion of the Kyŏngwŏn Yi family and a royal in-law, attempted to dethrone King Hŏnjong (1094-1095) in favor of his own maternal nephew. This was thwarted by Prince Hŭi with the support several officials, including two military men, Ko Ŭihwa (1049-1118) and Wang Kungmo (?-1095), who belonged to a military line of the Kangnŭng Kim that had been given the royal surname in the tenth century. Once Prince Hŭi took the throne as King Sukchong (r. 1095-1105), he gave both men promotions and appointments to important civil posts. This was undoubtedly reward for their merit in suppressing Yi Chaŭi's plot, but it also seems likely that

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over the countryside. For the first several decades of the dynasty, there were no centrally appointed local officials at any level and the center maintained control over the countryside through large military forces stationed at various protectorates and through the use of a hostage system. The various prefectures and counties remained under the control of the local strongman families who had arose during the final decades of later Silla and were arranged in an irregular patchwork of control and subordinate prefectures and counties based the relative status and relations of subordination of the leading families of each. During the reign of King Sŏngjong, the first "district shepherds" (*moksa*) were dispatched to key regional locales, but their authority was quite limited. It wasn't until the reign of King Hyŏnjong, nearly a full century after the founding of the dynasty, that the first governors, who had small staffs and very little authority, were appointed and the first centrally appointed magistrates were dispatched to a small number of prefectures and counties. More centrally appointed magistrates were established over the next 150 years, usually in response to incidents such as the P'yŏngyang-based rebellion of Myoch'ŏng of 1135. Nonetheless, there were centrally appointed magistrates roughly about 1/3 of the kingdom's total prefectures and counties at the time of the 1170 military coup. Furthermore, the rise of the military in the twelfth century as auxiliaries to the central civil aristocracy seems to parallel the rise of the Taira and Minamoto families in Japan, and the way in which the Ch'oe set up house institutions also seems similar to the early Kamakura shogunate. One difference, at Edward Shultz has pointed out, is that the Ch'oe remained in the capital whereas the Minamoto relocated from Kyoto to Kamakura. But the Ch'oe house also appears to have been preparing a regional base for itself in Chinju (the Chin'gang-bu). Shultz goes on to enumerate a number of institutional differences between Koryŏ and the late Heian/Kamakura, such as the nature of the ties between lords and retainers and the greater dispersal of power in the Kamakura era. It seems to me, however, that a more important reason may be the threat and actuality of invasion across Koryŏ's northern border. From its inception, Koryŏ was faced with powerful and often hostile neighbors on its north, a fact that probably had much to do with keeping Koryŏ together during the tenth and early eleventh centuries. Furthermore, within thirty years of the time the Ch'oe began to consolidate their control of the kingdom, Koryŏ began to be invaded by Mongols, who mounted six major and several smaller campaigns against Koryŏ between 1231 and 1258. Japan, by contrast, was largely insulated from external threats and invasions by the seas that lay between it and the mainland.

Sukchong, who actively pursued policies to enhance the power of the throne, was turning to the military as a counterbalance to the entrenched civil aristocracy. This was followed by two other major rebellions, one by Yi Chagyŏm (?-1126), also of the Kyŏngwŏn Yi and grandfather of King Injong (r. 1122-1146), who sought to depose Injong and seize the throne for himself in 1126, and one by a Buddhist monk, Myoch'ŏng, who after failing to convince Injong to relocate the capital from Kaegyŏng (modern Kaesŏng) to P'yŏngyang, arose in rebellion in P'yŏngyang in 1135. Military officials played important roles in the suppression of both these rebellions, with such men as Ch'ŏk Chun'gyŏng (?-1044) being made merit subjects and given appointments to high civil posts. The later decades of Injong's rule and the reign of Ŭijong (1044-1070) saw increasing numbers of military officials given civil posts<sup>9</sup> as officials of the military branch found common cause with a group of newer civil aristocrats such as the Tanju Han or the Chŏngan Im who were locked in a struggle for power against such older aristocratic families as the Kyŏngwŏn Yi, the Kyŏngju Kim, and the Haeju Ch'oe.<sup>10</sup>

From this perspective, the military coup of 1170 can be seen as much as a revolution of rising expectations as an explosion of resentment by military branch officials incensed at their mistreatment at the hands of arrogant civil aristocrats. Although conventional views declare that the military officials who revolted in 1170 wiped out the old civil aristocracy, the actual situation, as shown by Edward J. Shultz and Kim Tangt'aek,<sup>11</sup> was much more complex. While the 1170 coup did see the slaughter of some civil aristocrats, the rebels were selective in whom they killed and spared large numbers of civil officials whose descendants subsequently emerged as important officials during the years of the

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9 Pyŏn T'aesŏp, *Koryŏ chŏngch'i chedosa yŏn'gu*, pp. 366-367.

10 Edward J. Shultz, "Twelfth Century Koryŏ Politics: The Rise of Han An-in and His Partisans," *The Journal of Korean Studies*, 7 (1988-1989), pp. 3-38.

11 See Edward J. Shultz, *Generals and Scholars: Military Rule in Medieval Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000) and Kim Tangt'aek, *Koryŏ muin chŏngkwŏn* (Seoul: Kukhak charyowŏn, 1999).

Ch'oe house rule (1196-1258) after general Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn put an end to the fierce power struggles that had ensued among various military leaders during the first quarter century after the coup. To be sure, ultimate power resided in the hands of the Ch'oe family and its military allies throughout those six decades. The Ch'oe created a series of extraordinary institutions such as the Directorate of Policy Formulation and the Personnel Authority, located within the Ch'oe house, to handle important policy and personnel issues. The Ch'oe also had large numbers of military men appointed to top posts in the civil branch of government,<sup>12</sup> which they left largely intact—probably in order to implement their decisions. Nonetheless, the majority of the positions in the civil branch, including many top posts, continued to be filled by men of civil origins. Furthermore, the Ch'oe house even brought in civil officials to serve as advisors and as key members of its house organs. The Ch'oe house also entered into marriage relations with prominent civil aristocratic lines in what appears to have been an effort to enhance their own social prestige. All of this notwithstanding, Shultz' data, which identifies men by their branch origins, indicate that branch boundaries were largely maintained throughout the era of military rule, as only a miniscule percentage of men were known to have switched from the military to the civil branch or vice versa.<sup>13</sup> Such moderate policy notwithstanding, the mid-Koryŏ military rulers were condemned by the early Chosŏn compilers of the *Koryŏsa* for violating the basic principles of governance.

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12 Edward Shultz calculates that anywhere from 20% to 35% of first and second grade civil positions were occupied by men of military origins. See Shultz, *Generals and Scholars*, pp 72-88. It should be noted that the Kwangsan Kim genealogy claims that two generations of high military officials of the Ch'oe house era were direct descendants of a civil official of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, but I have not been able to find any confirmation of that relationship; it is not impossible, but it is just as likely that subsequent compilers of the genealogy simply created such a connection in order to give greater luster to a line that first arose as military officials during the military era.

13 See, for example, the table on p. 72 of *Generals and Scholars*, where only 3 of 80 men are shown as having had affiliations with both branches.

### III. The Blurring of Lines in the late Koryŏ

Although the *Koryŏsa* triumphantly says that the 1258 deposal of Ch'oe Ŭi (?-1258), the last ruling member of the Ch'oe house, meant the restoration of power to the throne and the civil branch of government, the reality was that the late Koryŏ political system was a far cry from that of pre-1170 Koryŏ. Many institutions created by the Ch'oe house persisted in various permutations throughout the late Koryŏ, including the Personnel Authority and the Directorate of Policy Formulation, and the civil branch experienced repeated frustrations in its attempts to recover its pre-1170 authority.<sup>14</sup> What is significant for the purposes of this paper, however, is how the boundaries between the civil and military branches, already weakened during the near century of military rule, became increasingly permeable. This was evidenced in three primary ways. One was the continuing presence of large numbers of men of military branch origins in high civil posts. Another was the way in which both civil and military officials could be found within single lines of descent, even among brothers. The third was the apparent ease with which men could enter government service in one branch, switch over to another, and switch back again.

It is well known that men of military origins held the highest posts in the civil branch at the end of the Koryŏ dynasty. I have not yet had the time to compile statistical data on this phenomenon and instead will rely on a sampling of cases that should sustain the argument. Perhaps the best known examples include Yi Sŏnggye, a military official who attained great merit in campaigns against Wako raiders in the second half of the fourteenth century and went on to become the founding king (T'aejo) of the Chosŏn dynasty in 1392, and his equally famous rival, Ch'oe Yŏng, the scion of a well-established civil official descent group known as the Ch'angwŏn (Tongju) Ch'oe, who chose a military

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<sup>14</sup> See John B. Duncan, *The Origins of the Chosŏn Dynasty*, pp. 154-182, for persistence of Ch'oe house institutional innovations and the difficulties the civil branch encountered in attempting to recover political power in the late Koryŏ.

career for himself and rose to be Chancellor before being removed from office by Yi Sönggye in 1388. What is less well known is that this was a common phenomenon throughout the entire late Koryŏ period. Kim Panggyöng (1212-1300) of the Andong Kim began as a Senior Eight Grade *Sanwŏn* (captain) in 1228 and worked his way up through the ranks of the military and the civil branch before retiring as a Senior Second Grade Executive of the Grand Chancellery (*Ch'ömmü ch'ansöngsa*) in 1278. Another example from the late thirteenth century was Chöng In-gyöng (?-1305) who held a long string of appointments as general before rising to the Junior Second Grade Assistant Councilor of the Security Council (*Milchik pusa*) and Supervisor of the Finance Commission in 1298. Chöng Yunhong was another man who held a series of appointments as general before rising to Assistant Councilor in 1320. Hŏ Sŏ was a general who, like Ch'oe Yöng, came from a well-established civil aristocratic line of descent but chose a military career; Ho rose to the post of Minister of Personnel in 1365. Han Pangŏn was a man of military origins who had great merit against the Red Turban invaders of the 1350s and who subsequently received a number of high-ranking posts in the civil branch, culminating in an appointment as a Senior Second Grade Executive of the Chancellery (*Munha p'yöngni*) in 1370. And, of course, there was the notorious Im Kyönmü, a military man of humble origins who rose to Chancellor, the highest office in the civil branch, before being removed from office in 1386. These examples not only show it that it was not unusual for men of the military branch to take high posts in the civil branch in the late Koryŏ, but—in the cases of Ch'oe Yöng and Hŏ Sŏ—that men from well-established civil aristocratic lines did not hesitate to choose to begin their careers in the military branch, a thing that would have been unthinkable in pre-1170 Koryŏ.

This last point is underscored by the presence in both branches of men from single lines of descent. The aforementioned Hŏ Sŏ, who belonged to the Yangch'ŏn Hŏ descent group, had two brothers, Hŏ Ũng (?-1411) and Hŏ Chin (fl. late 14<sup>th</sup> century), who pursued careers in the civil branch and who both rose

to top level positions. Within the same descent group in earlier years, the Executive of the Grand Chancellery Hŏ Kong (1234-1291) had two sons, Kwan (fl. late 13<sup>th</sup> century) and Sung (fl. late 13<sup>th</sup> century); Sung was a prominent civil official with a reputation for literary skills, while Kwan, as will be discussed later, appears to have opted for a military career. Cho In'gyu (1227-1308) of the P'yŏngyang Cho, one of the most prominent descent groups of the late Koryŏ period, also had one son, Yŏn (fl. early 13<sup>th</sup> century) in both civil branch and another, Yŏnsu (1278-1325), in the military branch. If anything, this tendency grew even more pronounced near the end of the Koryŏ period, with such prominent descent groups as the Munhwa Yu, the Chuksan Pak, the Haeju Ch'oe, the Ch'ungju Kwak, the Chinju Ha, the Hwangnyŏ Min and the Ŭiryŏng Nam all having both civil and military branch officials, often brothers or first cousins, in their civil official lines of descent.<sup>15</sup>

There are a number of men whose individual histories suggest that men were easily able to begin their careers in one branch, shift over to another, or even maintain careers in both branches at the same time. One is the aforementioned Hŏ Kwan; little is known about his career other than that he began as a civil service examination graduate and later held a post in the military branch as a Junior Colonel (*Nangjang*) in 1278.<sup>16</sup> Another was Kim Panggyŏng; as mentioned above he started off in the military branch but soon began to receive appointments in the civil branch, alternating between the two branches throughout his official career.<sup>17</sup> But perhaps the most interesting and best documents case is that of Cho Yŏnsu of the P'yŏngyang Cho. His tombstone inscription tells us that Yŏnsu, whose earlier name was Hwi, first entered government service via the protection privilege (*ŭm*, Ch. *Yin*) at age nine and held a couple of minor clerical posts. After his capping ceremony, he took up a position as a Senior Eighth Grade Recording Officer (*Noksa*) in the Divine Tiger

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15 Duncan, *The Origins of the Chosŏn Dynasty*, pp. 116-118.

16 Pak Yongun, *Koryŏ sidae ŭmsŏje wa kwagŏje yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Ilchisa, 2001), p. 649, fn. 17.

17 For detail on Kim Panggyŏng, see his biography in the Koryŏsa.

Division (*Sinhowi*). At age seventeen he passed the civil service examination; at age 20 he received appointment as a general in the Capital Garrison Division (*Sasunwi*). Shortly thereafter, he was given an appointment in the civil branch as a Senior Fourth Grade Executive (*Sirang*) of the Board of Revenue. This was followed by an appointment as a Junior Third Grade Grand General, then by an appointment as acting head of the Board of Revenue with a concurrent appointment to a mid-level post in the Censorate. Soon he was appointed acting Executive of the Secretariat-Chancellery in the civil branch and Supreme General in the military branch. At age 43, he was given appointment as Executive of the Secretariat-Chancellery, Director of the Pomun Pavilion of Letters (*Pomun-gak taehaksa*), and Supreme General.<sup>18</sup> The career of Yōnsu, who died at age 48, makes one wonder if there were indeed any effective boundaries at all between the military and the civil branches in early fourteenth century Koryō.

It seems clear to me that despite the *Koryōsa* claim that power was restored to the civil branch in 1258, the process of blurring the lines between the military and civil branches that began after the 1170 military coup accelerated during the late Koryō and that the military branch continued to play a very important political role throughout the final one hundred thirty some years of the Koryō. Indeed, it can perhaps be said that the 1392 change of dynasties, carried out by the military leader Yi Sōnggye, was in part a consequence of the political importance of the military branch.

#### IV. Restoring Order in the Early Chosōn

The founding of the Chosōn dynasty was accompanied by major reforms in almost all areas. The reform movement, which can be traced back to the early

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<sup>18</sup> *Cho Yōnsu myoji myōng*, in Kim Yongsōn (ed.), *Koryō myoji myōng chipsōng*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Ch'unch'ōn: Hallim taehakkyo Asea yōn'guso, 2001).

fourteenth century, gained serious impetus after Yi Sŏnggye seized power at the top of the Koryŏ government in 1388. The first major reform, that of the prebendal system, was actually pushed through in 1391, before the founding of the new dynasty, with the promulgation of the Rank Land Law. This was followed by a number of other reforms, including a major restructuring of central political institutions that resulted in significant strengthening of the kingship, of a greatly rationalized bureaucracy, and a regularization of the system of local governance that saw the elimination of the old Koryŏ system of control and subordinate prefectures and counties and their reorganization into a regular hierarchical system of administration with strong governors presiding over centrally appointed magistrates who were dispatched to all of the country's prefectures and counties. The division of the government into civil and military branches was reaffirmed and the system of ranks was also modified to have the highest civil official hold the Senior First Grade and the highest military official hold the Junior Second Grade, each one grade higher than had been the case in the Koryŏ. It was not, however, a simple matter to restore the principle of separation between the civil and military branches. Indeed, whereas all of the other major reforms were substantially in place during the reign of King T'aejong (r. 1400-1418), it took several more decades to reestablish strict separation between the civil and military branches.

Historians have noted the persistence of men of military branch origins in high civil offices into the fifteenth century; estimates of the number of military men who held offices at the top of the civil branch during the early Chosŏn vary from 10%<sup>19</sup> to 20%,<sup>20</sup> depending on the particular period examined and the criteria used to define top offices in the civil branch. Nonetheless, suffice it to say almost all historians agree that the early decades of the Chosŏn period, unlike later centuries, saw significant military branch participation at the highest levels

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19 Eugene Y. Park, *Between Dreams and Reality: The Military Examination in Late Chosŏn Korea, 1600-1894* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007), p. 34.

20 Duncan, *The Origins of the Chosŏn Dynasty*, p. 116.

of political decision making. This is usually attributed to the important role played by military officials in the founding of the Chosŏn dynasty and in the various political crises experienced by the young dynasty, including the princes' revolts of the 1390s and the usurpation of the throne by King Sejo (r. 1455-1468) from his nephew, King Tanjong (r. 1452-1455). The eventual end of military participation in politics is usually explained in terms of the influence of Cheng-Zhu Learning, which is routinely seen as the founding ideology of the Chosŏn. It is also generally believed to have been achieved not later than the reign of King Sŏngjong (r. 1469-1494), a monarch who is known for his strong support of Cheng-Zhu Learning and of the Confucian ideal of civil supremacy.<sup>21</sup>

It seems to me, however, that there are some problems with the conventional interpretation. One is that it does not take into consideration the extent to which the boundaries between the civil and military branches had deteriorated in the late Koryŏ period and the way in which that situation persisted into the Chosŏn. Another is the idea that significant military participation in the highest levels of political decision-making came to an end during Sŏngjong's reign. Another, closely related to the second, is the habit, born either of an idealist approach to historical interpretation or more simply of intellectual sloth, that attributes all the significant changes of the early Chosŏn period to the influence of Cheng-Zhu Learning.

Let me first consider the question of the boundaries between the civil and military branches. The generally accepted interpretation of the change of dynasties between Koryŏ and Chosŏn is that it was spearheaded by a new social element, described as the new scholar-officials (*sinhŭng sadaebu*), i.e., Confucian scholars of recent provincial origins who were locally-based medium and small landlords. This new group assertedly allied itself, as a matter of convenience, with Yi Sŏnggye and his military forces to overthrow the old Koryŏ aristocracy,

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21 See, for example, Yi Sŏngmu, *Chosŏn wangjo sa* (Seoul: Tongbang media, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 317-320.

which is described as a Buddhist-oriented, capital-based class of large-scale absentee landlords whose numbers included many men of military backgrounds. The underlying assumption here is that because these civil-oriented new scholar-officials were the driving force behind the founding of the new dynasty they were soon able to eliminate, or at least marginalize the military elements whom they had used to bring about the change of dynasties and attain a system of civil supremacy. Seen perhaps from a perspective based in the mid-Chosŏn period, this interpretation may seem valid, but it ignores the complexities of the first one hundred-plus years of the Chosŏn.

The apparent plausibility of such a view notwithstanding, as I have argued elsewhere, men who might have constituted a new scholar official group, such as the famed Chŏng Tojŏn (1342-1398) accounted for only a miniscule percentage of the men who held high offices in the new Chosŏn dynasty and Chŏng himself was purged and executed shortly after the founding of the Chosŏn. The vast majority of the powerful descent groups of the early Chosŏn were the same descent groups who dominated the late Koryŏ. Furthermore, the several descent groups that included both civil and military officials which I mentioned above (the Munhwa Yu, the Chuksan Pak, the Haeju Ch'oe, the Ch'ungju Kwak, the Chinju Ha, the Hwangnyŏ Min and the Ŭiryŏng Nam) were among the most powerful descent groups in the first four-five decades of the Chosŏn.<sup>22</sup> Simply put, the notion that the Chosŏn dynasty was founded by a new social group of Confucian-oriented scholar-officials is a fiction.

Furthermore, I think it important that we consider the institutional mechanisms by which these early Chosŏn descent groups perpetuated themselves. Again, the conventional view is that the civil service examination emerged after the founding of the Chosŏn as the primary, if not the almost exclusive, means of attaining office in the early Chosŏn. The reality, however, is that the protection

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22 Duncan, *The Origins of the Chosŏn Dynasty*, Ch. 3, "The Yangban in the Change of Dynasties," pp. 99-153.

privilege remained very important as a way of entering government service in the Chosŏn, and particularly so in the fifteenth century. It wasn't until well into the sixteenth century that nearly all of the top-ranking civil officials were graduates of the civil service examination.<sup>23</sup> In addition, there is a largely ignored set of institutions, the various royal/honor guards (the *Pyŏlsi-wi*, *Naegŭm-wi*, *Ch'ungsun-wi*, *Ch'ungŭi-wi*, *Ch'ungch'an-wi*, and *Ch'ungmu-wi*) that were established during the first six decades of the Chosŏn to provide sinecures and eventual avenues of advancement into the officialdom for the sons and grandsons of high-ranking civil and military officials who were unable to pass the civil service examinations or avail themselves of the protection privilege. It is not clear, given the limitations of the source materials and the current state of research on these institutions, what proportion of the men employed in these guard units actually went on to hold offices in the central government or to what extent these sons of high officials may have opted for either the civil or military branches after completing their terms of service in the guards. But given the fact that these were essentially military institutions and that service therein was regarded as fulfilling the early Chosŏn's requirement that all able-bodied men serve in the dynasty's military regardless of social status (except slaves and other menials who were exempt), their existence suggests that military service was still seen, as in the late Koryŏ,<sup>24</sup> as an acceptable means of entry into the central bureaucracy. The nature of these guard units, staffed by the offspring of high-ranking officials, is somewhat reminiscent of the early Tang *Lungwu* guards who were the scions of influential families and suggests that the early Chosŏn monarchs were still highly dependent on the support of aristocratic elements<sup>25</sup> just as the early Tang rulers had to rely on the Guangzhong (and to a lesser extent the Shandong) aristocracy.

23 Kim Yŏngmo, *Chosŏn sidae chibaech'ŭng yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1977), pp. 437-457.

24 In the late Koryŏ, it was quite common for sons of elite families to serve as palace guards (*sŏngjung aemae*) prior to entering the bureaucracy. See Kim Ch'angsu, "Sŏngjung aema ko: yŏmal sŏnch'o sinbun kyech'ung ŭi il tanmyŏn," *Tongguk sahak*, 9 (1966).

25 This is particularly obvious in the case of the *Ch'ungch'an-wi*, which was established by King Sejo to provide opportunities for the sons and grandsons of the merit subjects who supported his seizure of the throne.

But it was quite different from the imperial guards (*Chini wei*) of the Ming, who were made up of trusted military officers.

Now, let me turn to the question of when significant military participation at the top levels of political decision-making came to an end. As mentioned earlier, the general view is that it ceased during the reign of King Sŏngjong. Nonetheless, men of the military branch continued to be appointed to high civil posts throughout Sŏngjong's reign and beyond. A few examples include Ŏ Yusu (1434-1489), a general who was appointed as a Junior First Grade State Councilor (*Ch'ansŏng*) in the seventh month of 1478,<sup>26</sup> Pak Yangjin, who became a Senior Third Grade Fourth Minister (*Ch'amji*) of the Ministry of War, also in the seventh month of 1478,<sup>27</sup> and Pak Chungšŏn (1435-1481) a career military official who was appointed as the Junior First Grade Minister of Personnel in the tenth month of 1478.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, the military official Pak Chongwŏn (1467-1510; son of Pak Chungšŏn) was appointed as Senior Third Grade Sixth Royal Secretary in 1492, and went on to hold a number of other civil posts during the reigns of Yŏnsan-gun (1494-1506) and Chungjong (1506-1544) before finally rising to become Chief State Councilor (*Yŏng ũijŏng*) in 1509.<sup>29</sup> Other military men also held high civil offices in Chungjong's reign, including Pak Yŏngmun, who was appointed as the Junior First Grade Minister of Works (*Kongjo p'ansŏ*) in the 11<sup>th</sup> month of 1509, and Sin Yunmu, who was made the Junior First Grade Minister of Revenue in 1512.<sup>30</sup> Many of these military men played important roles in suppressing the 1467 rebellion of Yi Siae, in ousting Yŏnsan-gun and elevating Chungjong, or in the various literati purges of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. It might also be noted that the family of Pak Chungšŏn and Pak Chongwŏn was closely intermarried with prominent civil branch families who had marriage relations with the royal family and that the Pak family thus

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26 *Sŏngjong sillok* 9<sup>th</sup> year, 7<sup>th</sup> month, 15<sup>th</sup> day.

27 Ibid.

28 *Sŏngjong sillok* 9<sup>th</sup> year, 10<sup>th</sup> month, 4<sup>th</sup> day.

29 For details of Pak Chongwŏn's career, see *Chungjong sillok* 5<sup>th</sup> year, 4<sup>th</sup> month, 17<sup>th</sup> day.

30 *Chungjong sillok* 7<sup>th</sup> year, 5<sup>th</sup> month, 1<sup>st</sup> day.

constituted an exception; but the fact that a military line could be so closely intermarried with elite civil lines constitutes *prima facie* evidence that the boundaries between the two branches were still permeable during these years. At any rate, these various examples serve to demonstrate that men of military branch origins continued to receive appointments at the highest levels of the civil branch throughout the reigns of Sǒngjong, Yǒnsan, and Chungjong.

Chungjong's reign, however, seems to have been the last in which significant numbers of military officials were able to attain high civil posts. Such appointments became increasingly rare from then throughout the sixteenth century and beyond.<sup>31</sup> It appears that a turning point may have been the planned insurrection of Pak Yǒngmun and Sin Yunmu, which came to light in 1513. Pak, Sin, and numerous other military men were accused by the censors of plotting a coup with the objectives of replacing Chungjong on the throne with another royal prince (Yǒngsan), exacting revenge against civil officials who had hindered their progress, and attaining even higher offices for themselves.<sup>32</sup> Pak, Sin, and many of the others implicated in the plot were executed. Although this incident deserves further investigation, it seems to constitute an interesting parallel with the 1014 revolt of Kim Hun and Ch'oe Chil in that both were expressions of military discontent at the limitations imposed on them and both seem to have ushered in eras of increased discrimination against the military branch. It is also interesting, in this regard to consider Eugene Park's findings that the sixteenth century saw the widening of social distance (measured primarily in terms of marriage relations) between civil and military families as an early but significant development in the prolonged process of differentiation that eventually produced mutually exclusive civil and military lines of descent in the second half of the Chosǒn.<sup>33</sup>

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31 See Park, *Between Dreams and Reality*, pp. 34-37.

32 Chungjong sillok 8<sup>th</sup> year, 10<sup>th</sup> month, 23<sup>rd</sup> day.

33 Park, *Between Dreams and Reality*, pp. 45-46 and pp. 49-85.

Finally, let me consider the role of Cheng-Zhu Learning in all of this. Conventional interpretations stress the importance of Cheng-Zhu Learning in the 1392 change of dynasties and in shaping the reforms that were enacted in the early decades of the new dynasty, either as the class ideology of the so-called new scholar-officials<sup>34</sup> or as the inspiration for dynastic change and reform.<sup>35</sup> I have argued elsewhere that the kind of Confucian learning supported by the state in the early Chosŏn was much more closely related to the *Guwen* (Ancient Style Learning) of the Northern Song, with its emphasis on a strong and activist central state as key to attaining social harmony and dynastic strength, than it was to the Cheng-Zhu Learning of the Southern Song that eschewed the role of the central state and instead stressed the importance of individual self-cultivation and autonomous local institutions such as the village compact.<sup>36</sup> It wasn't until the mid-sixteenth century, in my view, that Cheng-Zhu Learning finally achieved hegemony in the intellectual and political circles of the Chosŏn.

King Sŏngjong is routinely regarded as a champion of Cheng-Zhu Learning, as the monarch who rolled back the pro-Buddhist reforms of his grandfather King Sejo and as the monarch who sponsored the appointment to important positions of large numbers of the *Sarim*, younger officials who had a strong commitment to a highly moralistic form of Confucian learning known in Korea as the "Learning of the Way" (*Tohak*; Ch. *Daoxue*). There is some truth to this: Sŏngjong did pursue a number of policies disadvantageous to Buddhism, he did emphasize the Confucian value of female faithfulness (often rendered as chastity),<sup>37</sup> and he did

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34 Mun Chŏryŏng argues that Cheng-Zhu Learning (Nature and Principle Learning) spread among the new scholar officials of the late Koryŏ precisely because it reflected their interests as locally-based medium and small landlords and thus fulfilled the role of class ideology for that group. Mun Chŏryŏng, "Yŏmal sinhŭng sadaebu ūi sin yuhak suyong kwa kŭ t'ŭkching," *Han'guk Munhwa*, 3 (1982).

35 Martina Deuchler argues that the founding of the Chosŏn dynasty was essentially an intellectual venture; she also describes the various social reforms of the early Chosŏn as Neo-Confucian (Cheng-Zhu Learning) "social engineering." See Martina Deuchler, *The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

36 John B. Duncan, "Confucianism in the Late Koryŏ and Early Chosŏn," *Korean Studies*, 18 (1994).

37 John B. Duncan, "Naehun and the Politics of Gender in 15<sup>th</sup> Century Korea," in Young-Key

encourage the appointment of large numbers of *Sarim*, apparently in hopes that they would constitute a counter-balance to Sejo's merit subjects, who were so powerful and well-entrenched that they inhibited his ability to rule as he saw fit. It is, however, dangerous to presume that Sǒngjong was a Cheng-Zhu Learning ideologue who invariably applied Confucian principles to all issues.

There were at least two occasions when King Sǒngjong directly addressed the question of the distinctions between the civil and military branches in court sessions. One was in 1477, when censorial officials serving as lecturers in the Royal Classics Mat (*Kyǒngyǒn*) argued against the appointment of military officials to positions in the ministries of Personnel, Rites, and Works. Sǒngjong responded in the following way: "Why is it that there is not one single military man in the mid-rank posts of the Six Ministries? What is the danger in appointing military men to the ministries of Personnel, Rites, and Works if they have the abilities to fulfill their duties?"<sup>38</sup> Four years later in 1481, censorial officials serving in the Royal Classics again raised the issue of appointing military men to civil branch positions, this time in particular reference to Ŏ Yuso's appointment to a position in the Ministry of Personnel. Sǒngjong was irritated by their comments and responded, "You have no idea of the qualifications of Ŏ Yuso to serve in a civil post. We now have a civil official serving as the Minister of War, so how is it that we cannot have a military official in the Ministry of Personnel? If we only use men of the military branch in military positions and men of the civil branch in civil positions, then this will violate the principle that ultimately the civil and military branches form one body as the officials of the government. Earlier you also submitted a memorial opposing the appointment of a military man to a civil position; do you not have any idea of the bigger essentials?"<sup>39</sup> These comments by Sǒngjong suggest that he was hardly a dogmatic believer in Cheng-Zhu

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Kim Renaud (ed.), *Korean Women in the Humanities* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003).

38 *Sǒngjong sillok* 9<sup>th</sup> year, 7<sup>th</sup> month, 15<sup>th</sup> day.

39 *Sǒngjong sillok* 12<sup>th</sup> year, 9<sup>th</sup> month, 6<sup>th</sup> day.

Learning, at least when it came to questions of how to deal with the elite stratum of early Chosŏn society, and that he felt no Confucian-inspired compunction to maintain strict boundaries between the civil and military branches.

Sŏngjong's comments contrast sharply with those made by King Chungjong thirty-some years later when Chungjong made the following statements during the Classics Mat lecture: "There are few men among the military officials who are worthy of appointments to *Tangsang posts*.<sup>40</sup> Shall we not simply give some of them advancements in rank as attendants (*kwansa*) when we receive envoys from the Ming? If we give advance military men indiscriminately, I fear there will be controversy; hence I suggest the idea of using them as attendants. Now we do not have enough men from among the *Tangsang* military officials to serve on the northern frontiers, nor do we have any men who are worthy of filling the roles of Grand Generals (*Tae changgun*) when I personally inspect the military. What are we to do when we find ourselves in a situation where we are forced to advance military officials?" Given that earlier in his reign, Chungjong had given high civil posts—including the office of Chief State Councilor—to a number of military men, we cannot believe that Chungjong had a consistent antipathy toward the military branch. It is, of course, possible, that Chungjong's attitude had shifted because of his exposure to such Learning of the Way ideologues as Cho Kwangjo, who controlled the bureaucracy for a number of years during his reign. But this statement comes from the year 1524, four years after Cho Kwangjo and his group had been purged. The old merit subjects were back in change and the Learning of the Way was clearly out of favor at the court. It is also possible, one can suppose, that somehow the quality of the officials of the military branch had declined significantly since the early years of Chungjong's reign. Nonetheless, I am inclined to think that the change in Chungjong's attitude toward the military had more to do with the plans that such military officials as

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40 Positions of the Senior Third Grade or higher who participated in policy formulation and execution.

Pak Yŏngmun and Sin Yunmu had hatched a decade earlier to remove him from the throne.

These various discussions between the kings and their officials do reveal that the kings were under some degree of pressure from the civil officials to limit or eliminate the appointment of military officials to civil positions. Whether the civil officials were committed Cheng-Zhu Learning ideologues who were urging the kings to do so out of a strong commitment to Confucian notions of civil supremacy and strict separation between the civil and military branches or whether they were doing so simply to reduce competition for the prized positions at the top of the civil bureaucracy is not clear. But at the very least we can say that it wasn't until the early decades of the sixteenth century that strong barriers between the civil and military branches were erected and that it wasn't until the mid-sixteenth century that Cheng-Zhu Learning began to attain a hegemonic position in Chosŏn intellectual and political life.

## V. Some Final Remarks

It is tempting to treat the late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn period as an anomaly created by the military exigencies of the Mongol invasions, the Wako depredations, and the founding of a new dynasty, and to argue that the existence of strict political and social boundaries, including the development of hereditary lines of civil and military officials, in both the early Koryŏ and the late Chosŏn tell us something essential about pre-modern Korean society: that pre-modern Korean society was uniquely disposed toward ascriptive privilege, that the Bone Rank system of Silla left a lasting imprint on Korea throughout the ages. Such an interpretation, however, tends to look at all of Korean history through late Chosŏn lenses and ignores such periods of significant social mobility as the Later Three Kingdoms era, the years of military rule in mid-Korea, the nearly 100

years of Mongol over lordship in the late Koryŏ, and—yes—even the transition from the Koryŏ to the Chosŏn. It fails to explain why it took as long as it did to erect barriers between the civil and the military in the early Koryŏ and the early Chosŏn, and it fails to explain why the boundaries were not re-established during the several decades of relative peace during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. To be sure, ascriptive privilege was an important aspect of pre-modern Korea society, but such was also true for pre-modern Japan and also for pre-modern China, at least up through the Tang period, not to mention pre-modern Europe.

In this paper, I have also tried to raise questions about the importance of Confucian thought as the origin of civil supremacy and the enforcement of separation between the civil and military branches. Although conventional interpretations of Korean history stress the importance of Cheng-Zhu Learning for the principle of civil supremacy and the relatively poor treatment of military officials in the Chosŏn period, how then do we explain the same phenomenon in eleventh and twelfth century Koryŏ? Perhaps, then, it is not Cheng-Zhu Learning per se, but Confucian learning in general. This certainly seems a more defensible position, considering that both the Tang and the Koryŏ were pre-Cheng-Zhu Learning polities. Certainly the language of Confucianism has been used for centuries to explain and justify many aspects of politics and society in East Asia. But such usage, it seems to me, constitutes self-serving legitimizing rhetoric on the part of civil branch elites in pre-modern times and simplistic essentializing on the part of modern scholars in both Asia and the West. It might be useful for us to take note of Alastair Iain Johnston's argument that the imperial Chinese world view was comprised of two different paradigms. One was a Confucian-Mencian paradigm that prized peace and harmony and valued civil over military. The other was a "Parabellum" paradigm that held the world to be a dangerous place and that emphasized the need for military force to ensure the survival of the state.<sup>41</sup>

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41 Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).

Tension between these two paradigms continued throughout Chinese history, with one or the other coming to the fore in response to changing strategic considerations. That such tension also existed in Korea would seem to be evidenced not only by the two branch structure of government but also by such things as King Sōngjong's statements implying that the military branch was as important as the civil.

When I consider the processes by which the principle of civil supremacy and the separation between the civil and military branches of government were strengthened in the wake of military rebellions in both the early Koryō and the early Chosŏn period, I find myself wondering if the Confucian rhetoric was, at the base, cover for more fundamental concerns: the fears of emperors, kings, and civil aristocrats that a prestigious and strong military might deprive them of power and position.<sup>42</sup> Considering what happened in the mid- and late Koryō and what happened in Japan with the founding of the Kamakura *bakufu* in the late twelfth century, perhaps they were right.♦

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42 Here it might be useful to recall the well-established interpretation that the Northern Song elevation of the civil branch over the military branch was the consequence of Song Taizi's determination to avoid the problem of powerful military commanders that had plagued the late Tang. See, for example, John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), pp. 123-124. Needless to say, this policy was implemented long before Cheng-Zhu Learning emerged as an important intellectual trend.

♦ Responsible editor: Suet Huey Soon (孫瑩珊).

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