Discoursing "Japan" in Taiwanese Identity Politics: The Structures of Feeling of the Young *Harizu* and Old Japanophiles
臺灣認同論述中的「日本」：「哈日」年輕人與「親日」年長者的情感結構[§]

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Abstract

This paper explores how Taiwanese people appropriate symbolic "Japan" to envisage, discourse and pursue their own—but hybridized—identities. Rather than asking "how the Taiwanese have been affected or dominated by Japan," which positions the Taiwanese as passive subjects, I emphasize their active engagement with somewhat idealized "Japan." The two questions are elaborated: (1) How do we understand that so many young Taiwanese enthuse about "Japan," despite simultaneous moral panic arising from a sense that this trend seriously threatens national/cultural identity? (2) How do Taiwanese people articulate and negotiate their subjectivities with such a culturally embedded "Japan," and further reshape their identities? I adopt the concept of "structures of feeling" to develop a historical/genealogical articulation between older and younger "Japanophiles;" and then discuss three historical events—the two disputes over Taiwan's revised textbooks and over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands in 1997, as well as the uproar over the provocative Japanese manga (comic book) *On Taiwan* in 2001—to find the role of "Japan" within a conflict-ridden Taiwanese identity politics. Finally, on the framework of comparative East-Asian sociology, I provide some observation to overview the trans/formation of the cultural-political relations and the peoples' identification between Taiwan, Japan, Korea and China.

摘要

　　對不同世代的臺灣人來說，「日本」持續被象徵性地挪用，以作為想像、論述和建構自身混雜認同的核心素材。相較於一種被動態的質問：「臺灣人如何受到日本殖民宰制和文化影響？」，本文嘗試追問：作為臺灣人的主體意識，如何積極接合其主動擬構的「理想化日本」認同？並據此回答以下兩個問題：(一) 如何理解臺灣年輕人的「哈日」情感，即使這種情感相應遭遇主流社會之污名？(二) 跨世代的臺灣人如何承繼或協商其對「日本」的文化印象，進而整合至他們彼此的集體認同建構？本文使用情感結構（structures of feeling）的概念，分析「親日」年長者和「哈日」年輕人之間跨代際的認同聯結與斷裂；同時也討論了二〇〇〇年前後的三個歷史事件案例：《認識臺灣》教科書爭議、釣魚臺主權歸屬爭議、以及小林善紀漫畫《臺灣論》爭議。最後，基於東亞社會學的比較研究視野，本文亦討論臺灣在「後哈日」年代的本土復振、中國磁吸與「韓流」趨勢中，型塑跨文化主體認同的可能樣貌。

1. Introduction:
Influential and Controversial "Japan" in Taiwan

As a dominant power in East Asia, Japan has repeatedly played an influential and controversial role in Taiwan's cultural politics. This role is multiply-imaged and historically embedded. Firstly, during colonization (1895-1945), the infrastructure built by the Japanese embodied a kind of colonial modernity, and Taiwanese national/cultural identification was transformed to a certain extent.[1] Afterward, while the succeeding regime KMT enforced "de-Japanization/Sinicization" policies in the post-war era,[2] Japan was still Taiwan's main trading partner and the object of cultural imaginaries.[3] It was thus impossible to rid Taiwanese civil society of Japan. Then in the past decades, through the transnational diffusion and reception of Japanese popular culture, the symbolic "Japan" has permeated almost every cultural field in Taiwan: mass media, urban landscape, daily consumption, tourist gaze, peoples' conversation, and so on.[4] On the one hand, Japanese popular culture is again celebrated as an

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1 E. Patricia Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Daniel A. Metraux, *Taiwan's Political and Economic Growth in the Late Twentieth Century* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991); Leo T. S. Ching, *Becoming "Japanese"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

2 Robert L. Cheng, "Language Unification in Taiwan Present and Future," in Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.), *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1979).

3 Gary Klintworth, *New Taiwan, New China: Taiwan's Changing Role in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Melbourne: Longman Australia, 1995); Shiraishi Saya, "Japan's Soft Power: Doraemon Goes Oversea," in Peter J. Katzenstein and Shiraishi Takashi (eds.), *Network Power: Japan and Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 234-272.

4 Ishii Kenichi 石井健一, *Japanese Popular Culture in East Asia* 東アジアの日本大衆文化 (Tokyo: Sosoya 蒼蒼社, 2001); Iwabuchi Kōichi, *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002); Lee Ming-tsung 李明璁, "Travelling with Japanese TV Dramas: Cross-Cultural Orientation and Flowing Identification of Contemporary Taiwanese Youth," in Iwabuchi Kōichi (ed.), *Feeling Asian Modernities: Transnational Consumption of Japanese TV Dramas* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), pp. 129-154 and "De/Re-territorialized Ximending: the Imagination and Construction of 'Quasi-Tokyo' Consuming Landscapes 去/再領域化的西門町：「擬東京」消費地景的想像與建構," *Router: A Journal of Cultural Studies* 文化研究, 9 (Dec., 2009), pp. 119-163.

introducer and a trendsetter of modern/metropolitan lifestyle. But on the other hand, the popularity of things Japanese re-casts a shadow over Taiwan's identity politics. The colonial past and war memories are simultaneously re-invoked by the omnipresence of today's Japanese popular culture, and the counter-discourses of decolonization and anti-cultural imperialism prevail at the moral core of both Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism.

Indeed, the tension and interrelation between commercial celebration and political anxiety, between the light of modernity and the shadow of coloniality, between young "Japanese"-fans, old Japanophiles and Japanophobes, has been significant in Taiwan across the decades. It is no exaggeration to state that "Japan" exists not only as a geographically foreign country and as an object of desire or abhorrence lying outside Taiwan, but also as a crucial component of identity formation *inside* Taiwanese subjects.

This paper, based on in-depth interviews, historical literature review and textual analysis, discusses how Taiwanese people appropriate symbolic "Japan" to envisage, discourse and pursue their own—but hybridized—identities. Rather than asking "how the Taiwanese have been affected or dominated by Japan," which positions the Taiwanese as passive subjects, I emphasize their active engagement with "Japan." The two questions are elaborated: (1) How do we understand that so many young Taiwanese enthuse about "Japan," despite simultaneous moral panic arising from a sense that this trend seriously threatens national/cultural identity? (2) How do Taiwanese people articulate and negotiate their subjectivities with such a culturally embedded "Japan," and further modify or reshape their identities?

I will firstly discuss the stigmatization of young Japanophiles in Taiwan and the following moral panic, then underlines the influence of the structures of feeling, a historical/genealogical articulation between older and younger Japanophiles. I believe this enables us to get at the real motivations of Taiwanese

Japanophile: not only superficial cross-cultural consumption but, paradoxically, the pursuit of self-identity. Furthermore, I discuss three historical cases—the dispute over Taiwan's revised textbooks and the dispute over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands in 1997 as well as the uproar over the provocative Japanese manga (comic book) *On Taiwan* in 2001—to elaborate on the role of "Japan" within a conflict-ridden Taiwanese identity politics. Finally, on the framework of comparative East-Asian sociology, I provide some observation to overview the trans/formation of the cultural-political relations and the peoples' identification between Taiwan, Japan, Korea and China.

2. To Be or Not to Be? —*Harizu* as a Self/Other

In 1996, Ms. Chen Guixing 陳桂杏, also known as cartoon-writer Hari Kyoko 哈日杏子 (penname), coined the new term *hari* (哈日) in her first book to describe the sentiment and behaviour of young Japanophiles in Taiwan. In the preface to her best-selling travelogue *I'm a Hari Addict* she depicts *hari* as follows:

> Even though you are not in Japan but in Taiwan, you insist on eating Japanese cuisine, watching Japanese TV programs, reading Japanese magazines, listening to Japanese songs, using things made in Japan, going shopping in Japanese department stores [……] You immerse yourself in a totally Japanized world all the time, otherwise you feel uncomfortable. If you feel poorly acclimatized in Taiwan, and are always interested in and pay attention to everything about Japan, while feeling

like a Japanese expatriate living in Taiwan, then you have undoubtedly got the *hari* addiction.[5]

In terms of etymology, *hari* consists of two words: *ha*, in Mingnanese (the most widely used Taiwanese dialect), is a verb that means to enthuse, desire or aspire to something and *ri*, in Chinese Mandarin, is an abbreviation of "Japan."[6] Chen (Hari Kyoko) told me she invented this word originally to make a contrast with a conventional Chinese term *chong-yang* (崇洋, worship the West) and to "depict a lot of local life experience strongly influenced by Japan." This new term has rapidly become widely used in Taiwanese daily conversation. On the one hand, *hari* refers to a specific emerging subculture and to the Taiwanese daily practice of a de/re-territorialized lifestyle; on the other hand, *hari* shows a strong cultural identification with Japan or even an intense desire to "become Japanese."

The mass media dub Hari Kyoko "founder of *hari*" or "leader of *hari-zu* (哈日族)"[7] and describe her as an extreme fan of things Japanese. Sometimes this image of "*hari* founder/leader" is used as a tool of commercial promotion and sometimes it becomes the target of anti-*hari*/Japanophobic criticism. Whether they love or hate Hari Kyoko, few understand her mental transformation. I interviewed Chen/Hari Kyoko dozens of times. By examining her life history, we find that "to be or not to be a *harizu*" is really a complex matter.

Chen was born in 1970 and grew up in a blue-collar family. She was fascinated by Japanese manga and pop idols during high school, in the mid-

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5 Hari Kyoko 哈日杏子, *I'm a Hari Addict* 我得了哈日症 (Taipei: China Times, 1998).

6 The adoption of *Mingnanese* in this new term reflects the cultural-political Re-Taiwanization of the 1990s. Since *Mingnanese* was permitted in the public sphere, more and more Taiwanese have begun to interweave this dialect—their mother tongue—with Mandarin, the national language, in their daily lives. Meanwhile, English and Japanese vocabularies often appear in everyday communication too.

7 *Zu* (族), in Mandarin, means tribe or ethnic group. But the use of "zu" to indicate a specific sub-culture (such as naming Japanophiles *hari-zu*) is adopted from the usage of Japanese "zoku" (different pronunciation but using the same Chinese character). Concerning the sub-cultures of various "zoku" in Japan, please refer to Mark Schilling, *The Encyclopedia of Japanese Pop Culture* (NY: Weatherhill, 1997), pp. 314-325.

1980s. Chen first travelled to Japan in 1992 with a tourist group. "Since then, I've been fully attached to Japan," she said. She became an assistant cartoonist after graduation and then spent all her savings to go to Tokyo for learning Japanese in 1995. Chen said at that time she "felt a sense of déjà vu, as if I was returning to another home." Afterward, Chen's best-selling books made her become a target of public attacks and even get harassment by telephone and emails. In two books published in 2000, Chen expressed deep anxiety about the issue of "*hari* vs. anti-*hari*":

> I begin to contemplate whether my *hari* cannot be tolerated in Taiwan. Why *ha-mei* (enthusing about and aspiring to things American) is not problematic but *hari* is.[8]

> While the *hari* trend is more and more significant and many people invite me to give speeches, the attacks on *hari* are intensifying [……]. I don't think *hari* is merely a shallow or blind following of fashion. *Hari* indicates yearning for a kind of delicate culture. Even though you can eliminate *hari*, the problem of Taiwan lacking such a culture is not solved.[9]

Chen's anxiety and musings reflect cultural-political tension in Taiwan. *Hari* has shifted from an individual preference for a specific/foreign culture to a collective tendency towards a specific/cross-cultural identity. The phenomena prevail nationwide (not only in Taipei) and among young female and male (not only for the teenagers but also for the twenties and thirties).[10] It is not a trivial sub-culture, but a controversial public issue. At the end of 1999, *Liberty Times*, one of the most popular newspapers in Taiwan, chose the top ten most significant

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8 Hari Kyoko, *Hari Tour Group* 哈日旅行團 (Taipei: China Times, 2000), p. 103.
9 Hari Kyoko, *The Pills for Hari* 哈日救命丹 (Taipei: China Times, 2000), pp. 4-5.
10 See Ishii Kenichi, *Japanese Popular Culture in East Asia.*

phenomena/trends in Taiwan at the turn of the millennium. *Hari* made it onto the list.[11] Meanwhile, the American *Newsweek* devoted a special issue to "Japanese Cute Power in Asia,"[12] which covered Taiwanese *hari* trends.[13] This report has often been quoted by American journals to explain the influence of Japanese popular culture in Taiwan. It stresses the intense attraction of "Japanese cute power" embodied in animation, manga, computer games and fashionable commodities. But I think this report is too narrowly conceived to grasp the whole aura of *hari* in Taiwan. The power of *hari* is not generated solely by so-called fashionable cuteness but is rooted in the imaginary of "Japanese modernity," the following paragraphs explore this further.

From 2001, *hari*, as an "issue" became more and more controversial.[14] Taiwan's mass media continuously championed Japanese pop culture in an attempt to boost profits. This could be traced back to 1994 when the Taiwan government removed restrictions on control of imported Japanese audio-video products. While the burgeoning television channels generated fierce competition and huge demand for programs, the always popular Japanese programs were viewed as a market panacea. Since then the media devoted considerable column space and air time to items of interest to *harizu*, continually drawing more and more Japanophiles into the ranks. But paradoxically, the media also labelled and stigmatized the *harizu* as a group of young people with an irrational obsession with things Japanese. During an official speech commemorating the 228 Incident

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11 *Liberty Times*, Dec. 19, 1999.
12 "Cute Power!: Asia is in Love with Japan's Pop Culture," *Newsweek International*, Nov. 8, 1999.
13 *Newsweek* translates *harizu* as "Japan-crazy tribe." I think this is an unsuitable translation considering its etymology as I point out at the beginning of this paper.
14 Japan's mass media also covered Taiwanese *hari* quite substantially. For example, one of the most influential Japanese newspapers, *Asahi Shimbun* 朝日新聞, reported and discussed the *hari* issue extensively over thirty times between 2000 and 2001 (e.g. Mar. 24, 2000, Sep. 1, 2000, Mar. 7, 2001). The weekly *Spa* also featured two special issues in Apr. 2001 to cover young Taiwanese *hari* (Apr. 18, 2001 and Apr. 25, 2001). The term *hari* has even become a new loanword in Japanese since 2000.

(the event will be explained later), the then Vice-president of Taiwan, Lu Xiulian 呂秀蓮 censured the *harizu* in a high tone:

> Those *hari* youths always dye their hair red. In order to welcome the visiting Japanese stars, they don't sleep and eat, as if they were crazy. We do worry that our young generation has been seriously invaded by the Japanese.[15]

Ms. Lu is certainly not the only Taiwanese publicly to criticize *hari*. Such criticism divides into three broad types. First, most cultural critics and academics look down on the subjectivity of the *harizu*. They see *hari* merely as a representation of transnational capitalism and cultural industry. It is nothing but a commercial construction, as well as a "practice of self-colonisation." Taiwanese sociologist Qiu Chuwen 邱淑雯 condemns the *harizu*:

> Their worship of Japan indirectly strengthens Japanese discrimination against the other countries in Asia. Thus I think that Taiwanese *harizu* are actually the accomplices of Japanese capitalists and colonialists, helping them maintain their dominance over Asia.[16]

Qiu's accusation is based only on the books of Hari Kyoko and actually failed to establish real contact with young *harizu* in their life world. Qiu thus commits a methodological error: she over-generalizes about this group of people within a taken-for-granted framework of knowledge. Simplistically stigmatizing the *harizu* cannot capture the people's subjectivity and heterogeneity, as well as their complex desire to imagine/practice "Japanese modernity."

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15 *China Times*, Mar. 1, 2001.
16 Qiu Chuwen 邱淑雯, "Cultural Imagination: Japanese Television Trendy Drama in Taiwan 文化想像：日本偶像劇在臺灣," *Envisage* 媒介擬想, 1 (2002), p. 62.

Although Qiu's criticism is untenable, it is a mainstream argument and frequently appears within Taiwan's media. *Harizu* are also constantly attacked by both the "Taiwan independence" and "China unification" camps. Perplexingly, these polar opposites gang up to suppress the *harizu*. However, their criticisms stand on rather different ground. The Chinese nationalists (in Taiwan) basically maintain the tone of previous KMT anti-Japanese ideology. They are either Japanophobes, who often mention Japan's brutal invasion of Mainland China during World War II, or "Japan bashers,"[17] who think that America, not Japan, is the real friend and best model for Taiwan. Many of them tend to essentialize "Japan" as an evil race with "naturally bad" characteristics. In contrast, while many older Taiwanese nationalists criticize the *harizu* as well, their arguments are not based on Japanophobia. They dislike young *harizu* not because of "bad Japaneseness," but because the *harizu* fail to absorb the real advantages of Japaneseness. In other words, these old people blame young *harizu* for their childish, ignorant experience of "Japan." Several of my elder informants describe themselves as "authentic Japanophiles," to distinguish themselves from young Japanophiles (*harizu*). Although they are all enamoured of Japanese culture— both traditional and once popular—they think that the *harizu* adore the wrong things: the superficial and merely sub/low-cultural. They may understand the *harizu*'s identification with Japan but cannot appreciate the passionate fandom behaviour and the trendy things about which the *harizu* enthuses. However, two of my young informants react to the above criticisms by stating as follows:

> *Hari* is fundamentally irrelevant to the nationalist concerns. No *harizu*
> likes Japanese militarism or worships their emperor.

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17 A term borrowed from Jonathan Rauch's *The Outnation: A Search for the Soul of Japan* (Boston: Little Brown, 1993).

> To be or not to be *hari* is actually my own business, irrelevant to those who dislike Japan. *Hari*, just like *hamei* (哈美 Americanophilia) or *hafa* (哈法 Francophilia), is nothing but a free personal choice of cross-cultural orientation. I think the real problem is our awful news media that always sensationally play up the extreme fan behaviour of so-called *harizu*. Thus *harizu* is bound to be stigmatized.

This stigma indeed exists in today's Taiwan. Few well-educated young people admit to being Japanophiles. During my fieldwork I frequently heard people say "well, I do like Japanese things but I am not really a *harizu*." When I asked them to elaborate on their image of *harizu*, most judged "those people" negatively, not unlike Vice-president Lu. Their logic is that "they are crazy *harizu* but I am not; *the Japan* I enthuse about is different from the *harizu*'s." The following excerpt from a newspaper article entitled *I'm Very Cultured and I Watch Japanese TV Dramas* is just an example:

> Apparently I am a fan of Japanese TV dramas. But actually I am not a fan in the conventional sense [……] Fans are always too passionate and too impulsive to recognize the more cultural meaning behind the dramas. I do not consume Japanese TV dramas by their way, I *read* them.[18]

In other words, for better-educated Japanophiles, while their relatives and friends often see them as *harizu*, they dislike this label, and vilify "another group of people," namely "those *harizu*." Such "self-Othering" keeps the *harizu* always Other—a strange group of *other* people who merely obsess over Japanese stars, follow blindly, dress bizarrely, lack a definite cultural interest, and are childish, irrational, fanatical, materialistic, and so on.

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18 Yu Ching, "I'm Very Cultured and I Watch Japanese TV Dramas," *United Daily News*, May 27, 1996; italics in original.

In fact, although the term *harizu* is popularly used for the young Japanophiles in Taiwan, those thus labelled and stigmatized seldom define and defend themselves in the public sphere. As a sub-culturally imagined community without definite scope, *harizu* have persistently been Othered—by the mass media, critics, scholars, politicians, marketing experts, nationalists, and even the Japanophiles themselves. The image of the *harizu* changes at times—both positively and negatively—according to the motives of those speaking for/against this "group." Sometimes the news media regard the *harizu* as crazy Japanese pop fans and sometimes politicians regard them as losing their national identity. The *harizu* may be an important marketing target, or even the unaware accomplices of Japanese neo-colonialism. No matter how people define, judge or even stigmatize the *harizu*, the subjectivity and the diversity of these young Japanophiles are ignored. Even *harizu* themselves make few self-approving comments. They merely adopt a rather defensive approach—"this and that (bad) behaviour belongs to the *harizu*, as the general public criticises. But I am not like *those* people, I am a *different* kind of Japanophile."

3. Reconsidering *Hari* through Structures of Feeling

More and more studies by young Taiwanese graduate students have begun to express different understandings of the *harizu* through more sympathetic approaches. They argue that the so-called *harizu* people are always heterogeneous and too fluid to grasp as a whole. These works try to break with conventional criticism of Taiwanese *hari/harizu*. They challenge stereotypes by stressing the plural practice, imagination and identification of various young Japanophiles. It is significant that the young researchers devoting themselves to challenging the stigmas of the *hari/harizu*. Just like Hari Kyoko, they all encounter the same mainstream criticism. The anxieties of these highly educated Japanophiles push them to choose between either continuously Othering "those

harizu" or re-examining and justifying "*harizu* like us." To a certain extent, the cultural theory of postmodern identity provides them with a powerful means of resolving their anxiety. To these young researchers, the sense of belonging is one of the crucial meanings embedded in the practice of the *harizu*. In Zygmunt Bauman's terms, such belonging is a "life project" but not a "fate as in the nationalist narrative."[19] *Hari*, as a cross-cultural lifestyle and identity, differs greatly from traditional identity formation (whether "Taiwanese" or "Chinese"). Such a postmodern identity, as Simon Frith argues, "comes from the outside not the inside; it is something we put or try on, not something we reveal or discover."[20]

In other words, young Japanophiles construct their sense of belonging/ identity through the direct experiences it offers of the body, space/time and sociability, experiences which enable them to place themselves in imaginative cultural narratives. Such an "emotional alliance," in Frith's terms, is at first sight close to Michel Maffesoli's concept of "postmodern tribes."[21] What interests Maffesoli is the surfeit of groups, situated between the individual and the mass, of which we are temporary members throughout the course of our everyday lives. He argues that such groups, postmodern tribes, signal the end of mass culture, which in turn points to "the tendency for a rationalized 'social' to be replaced by an emphatic 'sociality,' which is expressed by a succession of ambiences, feelings and emotions."[22] The life of postmodern tribes is "characterized by fluidity, occasional gatherings and dispersal."[23] It is through an engagement in various

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19 Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 175.
20 Simon Frith, "Music and Identity," in Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (eds.), *Questions of Cultural Identity* (London: Sage, 1996), p. 122.
21 Michel Maffesoli, *The Time of the Tribes: The Decline of Individualism in Mass Society* (London: Sage, 1996).
22 Ibid., p. 11.
23 Ibid., p. 76.

cultural practices—"rituals of belonging"[24]—that any postmodern tribe "declares itself, delineates its territory and thus confirms its existence."[25]

The above-mentioned studies by young Taiwanese researchers provide some empirical evidence for Maffesoli's concept. However, it is not enough merely to apply post-modernity to break with mainstream stereotypes and then de-contextually interpret the cultural-political meaning of *hari*. As Michael Taussig emphasizes, we should further examine the historical meanings embedded in arguments based on postmodern constructivism.[26] There is always a "particular history of the sense" (the subtitle of Taussig's book). No socio-cultural phenomenon is ever suddenly shaped by external/internal forces, but is always gradually becoming. If the *harizu* is really an emotional alliance, we need better to contextualize it, namely, to probe the complicated "structures of feeling" within modern Taiwanese history, rather than simply viewing it as a plural, free-flowing, ahistoric postmodern tribe.

The concept of "structure of feeling" was developed by Raymond Williams and has been further developed by many scholars to emphasize how culture and emotion are structuralized forces as important as political-economic structural influence.[27] As Hetherington points out, Williams's main interest was in "trying to understand what characterized the cultural outlook of a particular period and how that outlook change over time;" so that for Williams, "a change within a structure of feeling is brought about by successive generations rather than by specific social classes." [28] Although Williams captures the importance of

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24 Ibid., p. 140.
25 Ibid., p. 137.
26 Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses* (New York: Routledge, 1993).
27 Raymond Williams, *The Long Revolution* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965); *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); *Politics and Letters: Interviews with New Left Review* (London: New Left Books, 1979); Kevin Hetherington, *Expressions of Identity*: *Space, Performance, Politics* (London: Sage, 1998); Paul Filmer, "Structures of Feeling and Socio-cultural Formations: The Significance of Literature and Experience to Raymond Williams's Sociology of Culture," *British Journal of Sociology*, 54, 2 (Jun., 2003), pp. 199-219.
28 Kevin Hetherington, *Expressions of Identity*: *Space, Performance, Politics*, p. 75.

generational inheritance and conflict in analysing the structure of feeling, he seemingly assumes that cultural unity pertains at a particular point in time and that conflict, negotiation and the emergence of a new structure of feeling is generational. People however like or dislike, identify with or hate a culture in more differentiated ways than a simple generational model suggests. This applies both to culture in a narrow sense and lifestyle as a whole. Thus, I suggest that we should regard the "structure of feeling" as a plurality of *structures* of feeling, in which different social groups—not only the class in the traditional Marxist sense or the generation discussed by Williams but other categories present within a particular socio-historical context—inherit, challenge, negotiate and develop their identities. We should trace back the generational relationship between the *harizu* and the old Japanophiles/Japanophobes; and we must also consider how opposing attitudes toward "Japan" arise from the long-standing "ethnic" divergence in Taiwan.

To a certain extent, before the term *hari* was coined in 1996, Japanophilia as a specific cultural orientation had been very influential in Taiwan. *Hari* was not merely a trend or a boom; it was the recent expression of long-standing Taiwanese Japanophilia. To be or not to be *hari* is a question associated with the divergent structures of feeling on the island.

4. Japanophile Grandparents: the Trauma and Identity of *Nihongojin*

Huang Zijiao 黃子佼, a famous Taiwanese artiste, expresses his feeling of *hari* in the preface to his book:

> My enthusiasm for Japan is not only about pop things. From my childhood memories to recent travel experience, Japan to me is always so

familiar. When I walk on the land of Japan, this déjà vu always makes me feel at ease and somehow evokes my nostalgia.[29]

Also in the last part of Huang's book, he recalls how his grandmother maintained a kind of Japanese lifestyle in their old Japanese-style house during the post-war period and throughout her life. However, Huang's father was more Americanophile than Japanophile. Huang remembers that the relationship between his father and grandmother was somehow distant. In Huang's high school days during the 1980s, he was very keen on Japanese pop. After graduation he got a low-paid job at a television company and made an effort to save money to travel to Japan. Indeed, Huang's route to Japanophilia is rather similar to that of Hari Kyoko, and indeed many of the *harizu*.

Another writer, Xie Yamei 謝雅梅, also states that her *hari* is definitely rooted in her family's Japanophilia.[30] Xie's memories suggest that three generations of Taiwanese people share Japanophile sentiments.[31] But these are not identical: different generations, different discourses. The first generation is called *Nihongojin* (Japanese language people) by several Taiwanese and Japanese scholars.[32] This older generation comprises Taiwanese who speak Japanese well and are willing to converse in it. They were born in the 1920s-30s, and all received thorough primary schooling. Some of them were even further selected

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29 Huang Zijiao 黃子佼, *Jiaojiao Talk about Japan* 佼佼說日本 (Taipei: Crown, 2002).

30 Xie Yamei 謝雅梅, *Taiwan ron to Nihon ron: Nihon ni kitara mietekita "Taiwan to Nihon" no koto* [*"On Taiwan" and "On Japan"*] 臺灣論と日本論：日本に來たら見えてきた「臺灣と日本」のこと (Tokyo: Sogo Horei 總合法令, 2001).

31 Xie Yamei, *Nihon ni koishita Taiwanjin* [*Taiwanese Sympathizers for Japan*] 日本に戀した臺灣人 (Tokyo: Sogo Horei 總合法令, 2000), pp. 36-39; ibid., pp. 50-54.

32 Wakabayashi Masahiro 若林正丈, *Taiwan no Taiwangojin, Chūgokugojin, Nihongojin: Taiwanjin no yume to genjitsu* [*The Taiwanese Who Speak Taiwanese, Chinese or Japanese*] 臺灣の臺灣語人、中國語人、日本語人 (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha 朝日新聞社, 1997); Marukawa Tetsushi 丸川哲史, *Taiwan, posuto koroniaru no shintai* [*The Post-colonial Body of Taiwan*] 臺灣，ポストコロニアルの身體 (Tokyo: Seidosha 青土社, 2000); Huang Chih-huei, "The Transformation of Taiwanese Attitudes toward Japan in the Post-colonial Period," in Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb (eds.), *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895-1945* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

for higher education in Japan. This system of professional education bred various Taiwanese elites.

As many historians point out, widespread modern education was one of the significant achievements of the late Japanese colonization.[33] The literacy rate and the proportion of Taiwanese children in school increased more dramatically at that time than during any other period of colonial rule. Indeed, the promotion of education was also connected with the intensification of Japan's warfare. With the gradual implementation of the Japanese "southward advance" policy in the 1930s, Taiwan was elevated from a simple colony to become the centre of Southeast Asia and an extension of the Japanese mainland (the Japanese called this "inland extensionism"); this elevation influenced both the daily life and consciousness of ordinary people and, in the process, weakened the intensity of their resistance. Furthermore, island-wide patriotic mobilization, in the name of *kominka* (imperialisation 皇民化), was launched in circa 1940. It came to denote a specific cultural policy of social transformation accomplished by specifying how the colonized were to comport themselves according to the Japanese ideal. The adoption of Japanese surnames, regular visits to Shinto shrines, wearing the Japanese kimono, and speaking only Japanese were some of its formal manifestations.[34] Briefly, in the later stages of the Japanese occupation, Taiwan seemingly became part of Japan's national territory rather than a colony. The identification of Taiwanese, especially those born after the 1920s (the *Nihongojin* generation), thus became more and more pro-Japanese. As Leo Ching states, the

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33 E. Patricia Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945*; "Colonial Education in Korea and Taiwan;" Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); Zhou Wanyao 周婉窈, *Hai xing xi de niandai: Riben zhimin tongzhi moqi Taiwanshi lunji* [*The Age of Tide Passing: Taiwanese History of the Late Japanese Occupation*] 海行兮的年代：日本殖民統治末期臺灣史論集 (Taipei: Asian Culture Co., Ltd. 允晨文化, 2003).

34 Harry J. Lamley, "Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism," in Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.), *Taiwan: A New History* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 240-242; Leo T. S. Ching, *Becoming "Japanese*," p. 97.

then status of Taiwanese people was, generally and paradoxically, transformed from "colonial objects" to "imperial subjects" of a kind.[35]

Kominka was not only pursued through school education but also through popular culture, such as pop songs, films and mass tourism.[36] This cultural modification was supposed to make the Taiwanese identify themselves as the Japanese. Consequently, such Japanophilia emotions persisted in many Taiwanese minds after the Japanese left. Indeed, they embodied the colonial aspiration for modernity, for things better, more "advanced," and more "civilized"—common to the logic of world colonialism.[37] As Taiwanese ex-President Li Denghui 李登輝 once recounted:

> I was undoubtedly Japanese until I was 22. My name was Iwasato Masao.[38] As a Japanese, I received very orthodox Japanese education. Although later I also had Chinese education and further studied in America,[39] the most influential training in my life was undoubtedly Japanese traditional thought and culture which I learned during the Japanese occupation.[40]

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35 Leo T. S. Ching., *Becoming "Japanese."*

36 Zhuang Yongming 莊永明, *Recalling Taiwanese Folksongs* 臺灣歌謠追想曲 (Taipei: Avant-garde 前衛出版社, 1995); Li Dingzan 李丁讚, "'Marginal Empire': The Case of Hong Kong's Film Industry, with Hollywood and Colonial Japan Compared 「邊緣帝國」：香港、好萊塢和（殖民）日本三地電影對臺灣擴張之比較研究," *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies* 臺灣社會研究季刊, 21 (Jan., 1996), pp. 141-170; Ye Longyan, *The History of Taiwanese Films During the Japanese Occupation* 日治時期臺灣電影史 (Taipei: Yushan she 玉山社, 1998); *Nostalgia for Taiwanese Pop Music: 1895-1999* 臺灣唱片思想起 1895-1999 (Taipei: Boyang 博揚文化, 2001).

37 Ashis Nandy, *Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of the Self under Colonialism* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983).

38 Li Denghui often mentioned his past "Japanese" status. The first time was in an interview with Shiba Ryotaro 司馬遼太郎, *Taiwan kikō* [*Journey to Taiwan*] 臺灣紀行 (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha 朝日新聞社, 1994).

39 Mr. Li obtained his Ph.D. degree in agricultural economics at Cornell University in the United States in the late 1960s.

40 Kobayashi Yoshinori 小林よしのり and Li Denghui 李登輝, *Ri Tōki gakkō no oshie* [*The*

Mr. Li was born in Taipei in 1923. In the latter stages of World War II, Li's Japanese teacher recommended that he completed further studies at Kyoto University. He always remembers this time as a great epoch in his life. In fact, at that time most Taiwanese youths like Li were only dimly aware of the brutal Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945). The "mother country" for them was actually Japan, not China.[41] They could not fully comprehend the surge of emotion in China underpinning the call for a "struggle of all nationals to resist Japan to the bitter end." Japanese propaganda and news control meant that none knew of the Nanjing massacre. On the contrary, "children participated in parades and cheerfully ate red bean buns which were being given away to celebrate the incoming reports of the mother country's [Japan] victory," recalls one of my elder informants.

On 25th October 1945, the defeated Japanese transferred possession of the island to China. Taiwan ceased to be a colony of Japan. It was now a Chinese province. Most Taiwanese born during the fifty years of colonization, although their ancestors had migrated from Mainland China one hundred or more years before, knew little of the Republic of China. The bewilderment, disappointment and frustration felt by many Taiwanese originated in the first encounter with the landing of the KMT/Chinese army, and was accelerated by a series of ill-conceived policies carried out by the KMT government. Taiwanese frequently contrasted the daily experience of KMT and Japanese rule, contrasting the "strict discipline of Japanese troops and lack of discipline of the KMT army," "upright Japanese officials and corrupt mainlander officials," "clean Japanese and generally squalid Chinese," and so on.[42]

Teaching of Lee Teng-hui's School] 李登輝學校の教え (Tokyo: Shogakukan 小學館, 2001).

41 Huang Chih-huei, "The Transformation of Taiwanese Attitudes toward Japan in the Post-colonial Period."

42 Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica 中央研究院近代史研究所 (ed.), "The Special Issue on February 28th Incident (Part II) 二二八事件專輯（二）," in *Oral History* 口述歷史, No. 4 (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1993).

The then Taiwanese used animal metaphors: the Japanese were dogs and the Chinese mainlanders were pigs. Dogs might be fierce and could bark, but they are loyal and upright. Pigs are lazy, dirty, greedy, and do nothing but eat and sleep. The Taiwanese themselves were oxen, docile, resilient and diligent; they worked hard for their masters.[43] These metaphors indicate how the Taiwanese evaluated the strained ethnic relations after the war.[44]

However, the KMT government had no sympathy for such feelings. The *Outline of the Plan for the Takeover of Taiwan*, drawn up by the KMT's Takeover Committee, specified that "after the takeover the cultural policy should be focused on promoting Chinese national consciousness and eradicating the slave mentality."[45] In other words, the KMT government set itself the demanding task of both "de-Japanizing" and "Sinicizing" the Taiwanese. For example, the government abolished the previous method of dividing administrative districts and naming roads; it then re-organized the districts and gave all the roads new names drawn from traditional Confucian dogma or the city names of Mainland China.[46] Another significant policy was rigid mono-lingualism. From 1946, Japanese and Taiwanese were prohibited as a medium of instruction in all schools; all students and teachers were required to use Mandarin. Japanese pages in Chinese newspapers and magazines were banned too. The government halted imports of Japanese films regardless of their huge popularity, and prohibited Japanese dubbing or subtitles. This "Mandarin-only" policy was a hard blow to

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43 Huang Wenxiong 黃文雄, *Chinese Pigs, Japanese Dogs, Taiwanese Oxen* 豬狗牛：中國沙豬、日本狗、臺灣牛 (Taipei: Avant-garde 前衛出版社, 1997); Marukawa Tetsushi, *Taiwan, posuto koroniaru no shintai* [*The Post-colonial Body of Taiwan*] 臺灣，ポストコロニアルの身體.

44 In fact, these metaphors are still in use. The image of "Chinese pigs versus Taiwanese oxen" often appears in the discourse of Taiwanese nationalists. They continue to use the metaphors to distinguish "(good) Taiwaneseness" from "(bad) Chineseness." However, these hierarchical metaphors are seldom evoked in public to avoid sparking ethnic conflict.

45 quoted in A-chin Hsiau, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 52-53.

46 Lee Ming-tsung, "De/Re-territorialized Ximending: the Imagination and Construction of 'Quasi-Tokyo' Consuming Landscapes 去/再領域化的西門町：「擬東京」消費地景的想像與建構."

Taiwanese intellectuals, especially the younger generation used to dissemination of information in Japanese. Taiwanese writers who had established their reputations and worked exclusively in Japanese were effectively expelled from the now Sinicized literary circles. The literary language on which they had relied to express themselves was prohibited in the public sphere. Ironically, those generations educated in Japanese suddenly became "illiterate" under the rule of their "new motherland."[47]

It is hard to overstate how traumatic it was for the *Nihongojin* generation when their Japanese-speaking world suddenly became a Mandarin one. The language of the broadcast media changed overnight, along with the dominant state ideology and national identity. Many people even lost their jobs to the Mainlander newcomers because they could not speak Mandarin well or retained daily habits associated with "Japan" that offended official policy. Meanwhile, the economic situation and public security got worse and worse. The lawlessness, corruption and misconduct among KMT soldiers and officials were particularly unbearable.[48] The dissatisfaction of the Taiwanese exploded on 28th February 1947.

The "228 Incident/Uprising" was in fact inspired by a minor event: an old Taiwanese woman illicitly selling cigarettes was beaten by a mainlander policeman. This escalated into the most extensive island-wide popular rebellion and provoked the most violent KMT army suppression in the history of Taiwan. In the street fighting that followed, Taiwanese would ask anyone that appeared to be a mainlander if he spoke Japanese; if not they would beat him up.[49] On 10th

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47 A-chin Hsiau, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism*; Huang Ying-che, "Were Taiwanese Being 'Enslaved'? The Entanglement of Sinicization, Japanization, and Westernization," in Liao Ping-hui and David Der-wei Wang (eds.), *Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945: History, Culture, Memory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 312-362.

48 Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica (ed.), "The Special Issue on February 28th Incident (Part II) 二二八事件專輯（二）."

49 Ibid..

March, after the landing of KMT support troops dispatched from China, a large-scale massacre was carried out. Besides activists who were shot on the streets, anyone thought likely to criticize the government, whether they had participated in any demonstration or not, was subject to arrest and immediate execution without trial. The number of deaths during the entire incident remains unknown to this day; estimates place the figure somewhere between 10,000 and 50,000.[50] Most of those killed belonged to the elite of the *Nihongojin* generation.

5. Generational Conflict and Inheritance of Japanophilia

The KMT government kept banning Japanese actors, scenery and folk customs from appearing in domestic and foreign films except in special cases requiring prior approval; as well as commanded that all TV programs must promote Chinese culture. Mandarin is the only official broadcasting language. Mingnanese (Taiwanese language) programs should be limited in their quantity and broadcasting time, but Japanese is totally prohibited.[51] Such strict cultural control, including the embargo on Japan's cultural imports and restrictions on Taiwanese cultural expression, deepened the hidden hostility of many Taiwanese *Nihongojin* towards the KMT regime, and even indirectly provoked "nostalgia" for the Japanese colonization. One of my informants described her feelings in this oppressive environment:

> We could neither see and hear about things Japanese in public, nor see
> and hear enough Mingnanese programmes. It's really boring to watch the
> Mandarin dramas or listen to the Mandarin songs because I hardly

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50 Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*.

51 Government Information Office 行政院新聞局, *The Policy Statement about Re-opening the Import of Japanese Films, TV Programs, Videotapes, and Publication* 日本電影、電視、錄影節目帶、出版品開放進口之研析說帖 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1988).

understand them. The KMT not only banned the Taiwanese from maintaining attachment to Japan, but also constrained things Taiwanese. Taiwan was actually like a colony of the Chinese KMT during the post-war era, and the people were even more bitter than under Japanese occupation. I didn't care about politics; I just wanted to keep using my familiar language and keep enjoying my favourite Japanese films and *enka*. The government banned almost everything and strained to make us Chinese. I really did suffer. Frankly, at that time I would rather have returned to the Japanese era than live under KMT rule.

As time went by, the children of the *Nihongojin* generation were born in the post-war years and grew up under the KMT's de-Japanized/Sinicized education. Most *Nihongojin* gradually became a lonely and lost group. Many of them, like the above informant, chose to shut themselves away, inhabiting a world of the past, at one remove from real life.

Different ages speak different languages.
My family, like Taiwanese history, was actually splitting.[52]

This generational divide is also elucidated in *Dosan: A Borrowed Life* (1994),[53] one of the most acclaimed Taiwanese films of the last two decades. This film is based on director Wu Nianzhen's 吳念真 autobiography and, in brief, concerns a Taiwanese man (Wu's *Dosan*/father, born in 1929) who has long harboured a dream of visiting Japan. His dream can be seen as a wish on his part to affirm an identity and history forged during the Japanese period but which he was later forced to deny or repress in KMT-governed Taiwan. Wu once recalled how, as a student who was taught negatively about the Japanese colonization at

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52 Lines by an old amateur poet, written in Japanese, quoted in Huang Chih-huei, "The Transformation of Taiwanese Attitudes toward Japan in the Post-colonial Period," p. 133.
53 "Dosan," in Japanese, means father. Many children of Taiwanese *Nihongojin* use this Japanese word.

school, he hated his father's longing for that era—a longing which was ironically betrayed by Japan's indifference towards Taiwan after the War.[54]

Obviously, "Japan" is everywhere in this Taiwanese realism-style film. Dosan only listens to the radio in Japanese, watches Japanese films, likes to go to a Japanese-style bar with his friends to sing Japanese songs, prefers Japanese female bodies (to those displayed in the American *Playboy*), utters swearwords in Japanese, and harbours a desire, never to be fulfilled, to make a pilgrimage to Japan's imperial palace and Mount Fuji. However, the cultural habitus and identification of Dosan conflict with those of his children. In one scene, this tension explodes, when his daughter asks Dosan to help with her school homework: drawing a national flag.

> Daughter complains to her brother: "*You see, Dosan paints the national flag in such an awful way. How could I hand this in?*" (Showing the drawing of the red sun with twelve rays)
> Dosan tries to explain: "*I helped you out, how can you complain? If the sun is not red, what can it be? Only a ghost would see the sun as white.*"
> Daughter replies: "*Lu Haodong* 陸皓東 *painted it in white, originally.*"[55]
> Dosan starts to get angry: "*He is illiterate, are you as stupid as he is? You are really silly. Look closely at the colour of the sun in the Japanese national flag. Is it white? Nonsense!*"
> Daughter yells in Mandarin: "*You, everything is Japanese. Are you Wang Jingwei* 汪精衛?"[56]
> Dosan, not being able to understand Mandarin, gets angrier: "*Don't think that I don't understand Beijing dialect* [Mandarin]!"

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54 See *Views*, Feb. 1996, pp. 40-42 (in Japanese).
55 Lu is supposedly the original designer of the KMT flag. Every Taiwanese child learns the story and the meaning of the national flag in primary school textbooks.
56 Wang is portrayed in the KMT view of history as a Han traitor for working closely with the Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War. Through "successful" nationalist education, Wang has become the epitome of the Han traitor.

Noticing Dosan cannot understand her, Daughter utters in Mandarin again in a higher pitch: "*You are a Han traitor, a flunkey. You are Wang Jingwei!*"

Dosan asks the eldest son for help: "*What is she saying now? Bagyalou* ['Damn it,' in Japanese]!"

Dosan leaves the table and evokes the Japanese swearword again: "*Bagyalou!*"

As Chen Guangxing 陳光興 analyses, for Dosan, it is a matter of course that the sun should be in red, based on the Japanese flag. Thus the daughter has to refer to the original designer, Lu Haudong, to argue against her father. In order to maintain his authority, Dosan immediately defames Lu as illiterate. The conflict escalates. Under attack, being called stupid, what really riles the daughter is Dosan's invocation of the Japanese flag as an assumed referent, which is contrary to the anti-Japanese education she has received, whose "negative" feeling against the Japanese was overwhelming. Lacking any sense of Dosan's historical experience, "You, everything is Japanese" becomes a personal as well as nationalist attack. Later, when the daughter suddenly resorts to the "outsider's language," Mandarin, Dosan feels deeply upset. This intense fight between two generations ends with Dosan's Japanese profanity.[57]

To a certain extent, in the era when Mandarin and "Chinese" identity dominated, Dosan generation (the *Nihongojin*) became a relatively silent generation, a generation without their own language; and hence, became powerless and helpless. As Gayatri C. Spivak stresses, the subaltern "can talk but cannot speak themselves;"[58] the Japanophile sentiments of older Taiwanese were repressed during the post-war years.

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57 Kuan-hsing Chen, "Why Is 'Great Reconciliation' Impossible? De-Cold War/Decolonization, or Modernity and Its Tear (I)," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 3, 1 (2002), p. 85.
58 Gayatri C. Spivak, *The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayatri Charkravorty Spivak,* Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean (eds.) (New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 287.

However, the repression of Japanophile sentiment did not make it disappear. In fact, the second generation, the *Nihogojin*'s children, were rather heterogeneous and ambivalent. The above conflict actually shows only one side of the coin, the sad frustration of the *Nihongojin* generation during the de-Japanized/Sinicized era (Dosan's daughter is a typical child growing up with anti-Japanese education). But the other side of the coin is that Japanophilia was handed down, more or less, to the next generation. In other words, although the *Nihongojin* generation were at a loss, and felt misunderstood, hopeless and lonely, they still shared identification and cultural meaning with their children.

The director/leading character Wu, unlike his younger sister and brother in the film, seems more able to understand and sympathize with Dosan's Japanophilia. At the film's conclusion, he has become the "inheritor" of Dosan's structure of feeling, and takes with him a photo of his deceased father/Dosan when paying a visit to the Japanese Imperial Palace and Mount Fuji, to fulfil Dosan's final wish. Throughout the film, director Wu, the son and inheritor of a *Nihongojin* (and also the emphatic narrator) makes no negative judgement on Dosan's endorsement of "beautiful Japaneseness." Wu's sympathetic identification with Dosan is a recognition of his father's "borrowed life" (just like the subtitle of the film), of the desperate drive to escape it, and of the sense of hopelessness that this will ever be possible.[59] Such a "borrowed life," however, once set in the post-war/contemporary context, can be understood as a drive to re-discover the life lent to others, the attempt to stand on one's own two feet, to be independent, to be in charge of one's destiny, rather than to go on living in the shadow of the "outsider" (Japanese and later Chinese Mainlander). This drive, as Chen Kuan-hsing emphasizes, is precisely the base line of the structure of feeling for most national independence movements in the Third World, including the Taiwanese

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59 Kuan-hsing Chen, "Why Is 'Great Reconciliation' Impossible? De-Cold War/Decolonization, or Modernity and Its Tear (I)," p. 88.

one.[60] I elaborate on the relation between Japanophilia and Taiwanese nationalist discourse in the next section.

Furthermore, the anti-Japanese state ideology eventually failed to obstruct a more and more close-knit bilateral trading relationship between Taiwan and Japan, especially in the 1970s. One significant example is the "patriotic" boycotting of Japanese products in 1972, when the Japanese government severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This was a case of loud thunder but small raindrops. The collective anti-Japanese roar fizzled away quickly. Although the ban on Japanese cultural products still existed and anti-Japanese nationalist education continued, from around the late-1970s, the underground consumption of things Japanese became more and more popular. As a well-known Chinese aphorism—"above there is policy; below there is strategy,"—for example, many publishers dodged the strict government regulations through hiring local cartoonists to re-draw and "camouflage" the Japanese manga into quasi-Japanese Taiwanese manga, and then gained huge popularity.[61] Meanwhile, secretly broadcasting pirate videos of Japanese programs in local teahouses and cafeterias became an effective way to attract people, and various forms of underground circulation mushroomed. Illegal cable television and household satellite dishes, the newly developing media in the 1980s, further facilitated mass reception of Japanese programs. However, why did the KMT government relax its attitude towards these illegal but popular Japanese programs during the 1980s? I believe the government was well aware of these developments but ignored them. As researchers examining similar situations in other Third World countries have found, the government ignored illegal videos showing foreign programs because this new media consumption had the potential to deflect public attention away from the issue of strict media control and undercut the pressure for social reform.[62] In other words, since these illegal channels were flourishing mainly as

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60 Ibid..
61 Shiraishi Saya, "Japan's Soft Power: Doraemon Goes Oversea."
62 Douglas A. Boyd, Joseph D. Straubhaar, and John A. Lent (eds.), *Video-cassette Recorders in*

a result of the ban on Japanese programs and dissatisfaction with the three government monopoly TV stations, the KMT government risked widespread discontent if it took tough measures to stamp them out.

That was precisely when the third generation (grandchildren of the *Nihongojin*) were growing up. Through unobtrusive and imperceptible cross-generational influence within the household, namely the effect of continuously operating structures of feeling, as well as various external construction mechanisms such as media reception and pop consumption, a new generation of Japanophiles (*harizu*) were bred in the 1980s and came out in large numbers during the 1990s.

6. "Japan" in Splitting Taiwanese/Chinese Nationalistic Discourses

Based on the ethnographic and historical studies of the trans/formation of Taiwanese identities, Melissa Brown well argues that identity is actually shaped by social and life experiences, not ancestry and traditional culture.[63] Briefly, a review of the two crucial drives underpinning Taiwanese Japanophilia helps tease out its role in the Taiwan nationalist discourse: the experience of colonial modernity[64] and the disappointment with and even hatred for the Chinese KMT regime.[65]

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the Third World* (London: Longman, 1989).

63 Melissa J. Brown, *Is Taiwan Chinese?: The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

64 Wu Micha 吳密察, *The Study of Modern Taiwan History* 臺灣近代史研究 (Taipei: Daw Shiang Publishing Co., Ltd. 稻鄉出版, 1994); Huang Chih-huei, "The Transformation of Taiwanese Attitudes toward Japan in the Post-colonial Period;" Chou Wan-yao, *The Age of Tide Passing: Taiwanese History of the Late Japanese Occupation.*

65 Wang Yude 王育德, *Taiwan: An Oppressive History* 臺灣──苦悶するその歴史 (Tokyo: Kobundo 弘文堂, 1970); Huang Wenxiong 黃文雄, *Korean "Anti-Japan", Taiwanese "Pro-*

Indeed, for most Taiwanese, Japanese "colonialism," from 1895 to 1945, is the basic historical memory of Japan. Whether couched in positive or negative terms, the intricate entanglement of love and hate with the ex-colonizer, constituted as the symbol of "the modern," is archetypical for the Third World ex-colonized. However, for Chinese mainlanders, the dominant historical memory of "Japan" is concerning the eight-year Sino-Japanese War. For them, from the beginning of the war, the sign "Japan" carried no positive value. It is fair to say that anti-Japanese or Japanophobic sentiments are the most critical elements for the contemporary Chinese nationalist subject both in the mainland and in Taiwan.

It is crucial to understand that, for most Chinese-diaspora-in-Taiwan, the colonial modernization in Taiwan actually means nothing at all in their anti-Japanese sentiment, because they never experienced it – it is wiped out in their historical memory. As Chen well argues,

> The divergence of living memory and experience constitutes two different structures of mind-sets vis-à-vis Japanese colonialism. These two emotional structures are mediated through different imaginations of "Japan" and expressed attitudes towards Japan form the opposing emotional bases between *ben-sheng-ren* and *wai-sheng-ren*. It further generates an impossibility of mutual understanding between "Taiwanese" and "Mainland Chinese": the dichotomy of modern and progressive Japan vs. the "Japanese devil" is the opposing emotional logic.[66]

That is also why Chen Peifeng 陳培豐 argues that after the Sino-Japanese War, nationalism continuously developed both in Taiwan and Mainland China,

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Japan" 韓國人の「反日」、臺灣人の「親日」：朝鮮總督府と臺灣總督府 (Tokyo: Kobunsha 光文社, 1999).

66 Kuan-hsing Chen, "Why Is 'Great Reconciliation' Impossible? De-Cold War/Decolonization, or Modernity and Its Tear (II)," p. 236.

but with different characteristics, which he terms "modernistic" nationalism in Taiwan, and "historic" nationalism in mainland China. [67] Both types of nationalistic discourse exist simultaneously and keep argue against each other in Taiwan.

To sum up, the war experiences on the mainland have made the people anti-Japanese, making it impossible for them to give the local complex about the Japanese occupation a sympathetic hearing. Meanwhile many of Taiwanese *Nihongojin* cannot empathize with Chinese diaspora's suffering through forced migration along with the defeated regime under the Cold War structure. In other words, conditioned mainly by the structural axis of colonialism, many of the Taiwanese cannot understand the Chinese diaspora's emotional structure produced by three successive wars—the Sino-Japanese War, the Civil War and the Cold War; and conversely, shaped primarily by the above wars, Chinese mainlanders cannot understand the cultural effects of Japanese colonialism on an emotional level. Consequently, in terms of subjective thought, the two collective structures of feeling have run parallel to each other, as if there were no intersecting zone; but in the objective historical conditions, they have lived together in Taiwan for over a half century with the two overlapping axes.

This contradictory situation has not yet faded away in Taiwan, though the cultural and political climate has changed. By discussing the following three historical events, I illustrate how symbolic "Japan" has been continuously deployed to construct or defend different nationalistic imaginations.

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67 Chen Peifeng 陳培豐, *Different Dream Behind Assimilation: Re-thinking Taiwan's Language Education during Japanese Rule* 「同化」の同床異夢──日本統治下臺灣の國語教育史再考 (Tokyo: Sangensha 三元社, 2001), pp. 302-308.

(1) The Dispute Over Revised History Textbooks

This dispute flared up in 1997. It can be seen as a result of the more and more intense competition between two nationalistic ideologies in Taiwan— "Taiwan independence" and "China reunification." The particularly noteworthy point is that "Japan" became the focus of this domestic policy debate.

Briefly, before the 1990s, teaching Taiwanese local history, geography or literature in public could be construed as illegally promoting "Taiwan independence." Even during the liberalized political climate of the 1990s, the compulsory textbooks used in Taiwan's primary and secondary schools remained basically the same as those brought to the island by the KMT in 1949. "China" dominates the narrative, while "Taiwan" is portrayed merely as a small, unimportant province. As a result, students learn very little about the island they live on and call "home." Hence in 1997, new textbooks entitled *Renshi Taiwan* 認識臺灣 (Understanding Taiwan) were released. But the revision immediately caused political turmoil. Politicians, journalists and scholars criticized the new textbooks for "severing relations between Taiwan and its motherland China" and "paving the way for the Taiwan independence movement, under the false pretence of telling students about Taiwan."[68]

The critics claimed that "getting to know Taiwan" should be based on two premises: "Taiwan has always been a part of China from ancient times to the present" and "Japanese rule in Taiwan was extremely violent and unpopular." They cited over one hundred "errors and omissions" especially in the chapters on Japanese occupation. They charged that the texts highlighted the accomplishments and legacies of Japanese rule, and paid less attention to the mainlanders' later contribution to Taiwan. As legislator Li Qinghua 李慶華, who spearheaded the objectors' group, stated, "the textbooks exalt the Japanese, exaggerate the

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68 quoted in Huang Wenxiong, *Korean "Anti-Japan", Taiwanese "Pro-Japan"* 韓國人の「反日」、臺灣人の「親日」：朝鮮總督府と臺灣總督府, pp. 116-117.

accomplishments of Japanophile Li Denghui [the then President], and show bias against the mainlanders who came over with the KMT in 1949."[69]

What the critics were really concerned about was that the revised textbooks were too "Taiwanese-oriented" and Japanophile and might wear down the "Chineseness" of Taiwanese people[70]. Their arguments projected an anxiety about the increasingly emotional re-articulation between the older Japanophiles and the younger ones (school children who might become or were becoming *harizu*), as well as about the increasing local tendency towards a pro-Japan/anti-China and "Taiwan independence" stance. Although the Japanese government has never lent its support to Taiwan independence, pro-China politicians in Taiwan like to portray independence advocates as the puppets of Japanese imperialists. As the legislator Fong Dinggou 馮定國 once said, "the Taiwan independence movement is not independent. It depends on Japanese militarism."[71] We can see that "Japan" has again become a scapegoat, evoked as a vicious force manipulating the Taiwanese nationalist movement behind the scenes. As discussed in the last section, this argument reflects the long-standing structure of feeling—a trinity of anti-Japanese, Sinocentric and un-Taiwanese.

(2) The Dispute Over the Sovereignty of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands

The Senkaku Islands (Japanese toponym, called Diaoyutai 釣魚臺 in Mandarin) are five islets and three barren rocks 200 miles off the Chinese coast, northeast of Taiwan. China claims the "Diaoyutai," based on navigational records that show the islands to be Chinese territory since as far back as around 1430. But Japan also claims the "Senkaku," based on its "discovery" of the islets in the seventeen century; it annexed them in 1895, the same time it took Taiwan from China. Japan was the first country to occupy the chain, and it operated a fishing

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69 quoted in *Asiaweek*, Aug. 7, 1997.
70 Laura Hein and Mark Selden (eds.), *Censoring History* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 45.
71 quoted in *New York Times*, Mar. 2, 2001.

cannery there in the early twentieth century. The islands fell under American jurisdiction after World War II (like Okinawa) and China seemed to accept non-Chinese sovereignty over the islands during the 1950s-60s. Many observers thought that China and Taiwan's "sudden interest in the islands was caused by a UN agency report in 1968 revealing the presence of oil in the area."[72]

In July 1997, a right-wing Japanese group constructed a lighthouse on one of the islands, infuriating many Chinese. A series of protests named "*Baodiao-Yundong* 保釣運動" (Campaign in Defence of the Diaoyutai) against the "resurgence of Japanese imperialism" (as some Chinese mass media put it) were held; these were especially vehement in Hong Kong.[73] Scattered demonstrations were held in Taiwan; some petitions focussed their ire on Li Denghui's government, urging it to take stronger action against Japan. Compared with the strong Chinese nationalistic discourse in Hong Kong, the mainstream discourse on this dispute was rather muted in Taiwan. When Li Denghui stepped down from the presidency in 2000, he even claimed in public several times that the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands "originally belong to Okinawa and Japan, they are neither China's nor Taiwan's territory;"[74] "Taiwan merely has the authority to fish around the Diaoyutai, but actually has no sovereignty over them."[75] It goes without saying that the enraged anti-Japanese camp again condemned Lee.

Ishii Kenichi's comparative research reveals that 45 percent of Hong Kong Chinese support the *Baodiao-Yundong*, including nearly 50 percent of those who often consume things Japanese in their daily lives.[76] In other words, many Hong Kong Chinese are in two minds: enthusiasts about Japanese commodities and protesters against Japanese imperialism. Gordon Mathews regards these co-

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72 *South China Morning Post*, Oct. 11, 1996.
73 Gordon Mathews, "A Collision of Discourses: Japanese and Hong Kong Chinese during the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Crisis," in Harumi Befu and Sylvie Guichard-Auguis (eds.), *Globalizing Japan: Ethnography of the Japanese Presence in Asia, Europe, and America* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 153-175.
74 *Okinawa Times*, Sep. 9, 2002.
75 *United Daily News*, Oct. 20, 2002.
76 Ishii Kenichi, *Japanese Popular Culture in East Asia*.

existing pro/anti-Japan sentiments as a reflection of Hong Kong's identity discourse, which comprises (world) capitalism/consumerism and (Chinese) nationalism simultaneously.[77] However, the situation in Taiwan is different. Ishii finds that few Taiwanese *harizu* support the *Baodiao-Yundong*. Only a minority of Taiwanese people who dislike things Japanese support the protest against Japan.[78] An editorial in Hong Kong's *East Daily* claimed that the increasing support for Taiwan independence means that fewer and fewer Taiwanese people are concerned about the Diaoyutai issue. Although Hong Kong was ruled by the British, most people maintain their clear identification as Chinese.[79] Here we see again how a different inheritance and the development of conflicting structures of feeling structuralise people's identity orientation and subjective action.

(3) The Dispute Over the Manga *On Taiwan* (2000)

This manga was created by Kobayashi Yoshinori, one of the founders of an active Japanese right-wing group; and its Chinese translation was published, became a bestseller and provoked a strong protest in Taiwan in 2001. After visiting Taiwan several times (hosted by Japanophile politicians, businessmen and writers), observing "good old Japan" as colonial remnant, and hearing pro-Japanese compliments from Taiwanese, especially the two Presidents—Li Denghui and Chen Shuibian 陳水扁—Kobayashi became convinced that Taiwan is the country Japan can trust most, precisely because it cherishes and fosters Japanese colonial legacies. In such a tone, Kobayashi depicts how "good old Japanese spirit and values" are still alive in Taiwan in sophisticated ways. As Edward Said states, imperialists not only project their own cognition onto the colony to define the colonized culture, they also define and affirm themselves by continuously changing their relationship with the colony.[80] Thus the imperialist

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77 Gordon Mathews, "A Collision of Discourses: Japanese and Hong Kong Chinese during the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Crisis."
78 Ishii Kenichi, *Japanese Popular Culture in East Asia*.
79 *East Daily*, Oct. 1, 1996.
80 Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopt, 1993).

subjectivity operates through its power relation with the colony. By viewing the slogans on the front cover of *On Taiwan*, we can easily see how Kobayashi tries to re-define/construct Japanese subjectivity by projecting his own desire onto Taiwan:

> What's the meaning of *Japanese*?
>
> What's the meaning of nation-state?
>
> The answer can be only found in our neighbour maintaining Japanese legacies!

Thus Kobayashi admits that "*On Taiwan* is actually also *On the Japanese*, we are rethinking and reaffirming Japan by viewing Taiwan."[81] Throughout the book, Kobayashi elaborately constructs a Japanocentric historical view of Taiwan by presenting numerous nostalgic descriptions by Taiwanese Japanophiles—from the Presidents to ordinary people. However, for Kobayashi, the recent *hari* culture among the younger generation of Taiwanese is neither truly "cultural" nor socially realistic; it shows the triviality of Taiwan's affectionate relationship with Japan (Kobayashi also uses the same tone to accuse contemporary youth culture in Japan).[82] While obviously seeing the spread of Japanese popular culture in Taiwan narcissistically, Kobayashi refers to the phenomenon at the outset of the book, lamenting that these youths do not understand "the deep historical meaning underlying their enthusiasm for Japan":

> It is a pity that while there are so many *harizu* in Taiwan, young people neither in Japan nor Taiwan know the historical fact that the two nations were quite closely attached and lived together. Sound historical

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81 Kobayashi Yoshinori and Lee Teng-hui, *The Teaching of Lee Teng-hui's School*, p. 163.

82 See Aaron Gerow, "Consuming Asia, Consuming Japan: The New Neonationalistic Revisionism in Japan," in Laura Hein and Mark Selden (eds.), *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 74-95.

perception engenders culture. The history [of Japanese colonial rule] should not be forgotten, in order for Taiwan to produce its own higher-level culture in the future.[83]

Discourses associated with *On Taiwan* have abounded, as have those protesting against it. Unlike the earlier events, which was only disputed at the local level, many Japanese critics and scholars also joined the debate about *On Taiwan*. The Taiwanese critics are once again primarily Chinese nationalists. In the dispute over textbooks and the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai, their enemy, Japan, was just a colonialist ghost from the past. The relationship between "Japan" and the discourse of "Taiwan independence" was comparatively indirect and required further articulation. But since the dispute over *On Taiwan*, the situation has obviously changed. The partnership between Japanese right-wingers and some Taiwanese nationalists has been apparent.[84] It is thus little wonder that the anti-Japanese/anti-Taiwan independence people were infuriated and adopted more radical action such as burning books, the Japanese national flag and photos of Lee Tenghui together. They even accused young *harizu* (Hari Kyoko was the main target) of being accomplices of so-called "Japanese neo-imperialism," although Hari Kyoko has never expressed her attitude about Taiwan independence or shown sympathy for Japanese rightist ideology.

In Japan, the criticism of *On Taiwan* continued the previous debate in 1998 when Kobayashi's provocative *On War* became a bestseller in Japan, and then broadened the critical scope.[85] Most of the critics worried that the articulation between Japanese right-wingers and Taiwanese nationalists would cause

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83 Kobayashi Yoshinori, *Taiwan ron* [*On Taiwan*] 臺灣論 (Tokyo: Shogakukan 小學館, 2000), p. 12.

84 Li Shoulin 李壽林 (ed.), *San jiao zai: Taiwan Lun yu huangminhua pipan* [*Critique against On Taiwan and Japan's Imperialization* 三腳仔：《臺灣論》與皇民化批判 (Taipei: Strait Academic Press 海峽學術出版社, 2001).

85 Aaron Gerow, "Consuming Asia, Consuming Japan: The New Neonationalistic Revisionism in Japan."

"Taiwan-Japan chain colonialism." On this view, Taiwan risks "self-colonization."[86] This argument however seems to reflect a specific ideology rather than Taiwan's social reality. While such Japanese critics have good intentions, wishing to make Taiwanese aware of the risks they supposedly face, they fail to engage sympathetically and contextually with the Taiwanese structures of feeling that underpin the close articulation between Japanophile and Taiwanese nationalistic discourses, as discussed in the previous section. Critics claim that many Japanese right-wingers "kiss the baby for the nurse's sake," meaning they exploit Taiwanese Japanophilia to spread their propaganda, but this truth does not necessarily mean that Taiwanese will automatically accept their right-wing ideology and become self-colonized.

7. Reconsidering Taiwanese Japanophilia in Modern East-Asian Context

In this final section I will put my discussion back to the modern East-Asian context to: (1) compare Taiwanese identification with the idealized/symbolic "Japan" and the "Othering" of China; (2) compare the post/colonial experiences of Korea (under Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945) with Taiwanese Japanophilia; (3) provide some observations of the post-*hari* possibilities and implications for the Taiwanese.

(1) The Idealized/symbolic "Japan" and the "Othering" of China

Taiwanese people continuously produce discourses on the "Japanese spirit" or "Japaneseness." While they appear to cherish the memory of Japanese

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86 Mori Yoshio 森宣雄, *Taiwan/Nihon: rensasuru koroniarizumu* [*Taiwan/Japan: the Chain Colonialism*] 臺灣／日本──連鎖するコロニアリズム (Tokyo: Impact インパクト出版會, 2001).

colonization, at a deeper level they have actually gone beyond such nostalgia. This is a kind of signifying practice generating discourses on the "Japanese spirit." The construction of the symbolized and idealized "Japan" was originally a way of resisting the KMT ideological autarchy of the post-war era, and is now paradoxically deployed against the "one China" claims by both the KMT government and the CCP regime (and the military threat it represents). As Denny Roy argues, the political integration/unification would not be easy at all in the future even there are really strong and abiding ties.[87] In fact, for many Taiwanese (especially the Japanophiles), "China" is continuously "Othered" and stigmatized while "Japan" is idealized. This differencing identity practice, rooted in Taiwanese structures of feeling, developed around the 228 Incident/Uprising of 1947 and has been maintained to the present day.

For example, when the SARS virus ravaged China, Taiwan and Hong Kong in 2003, many Taiwanese and some media labelled it "Chinese pneumonia" because they believed it originated in "dirty China." Conversely, politicians and the media often heralded Japan's efforts to totally control the virus. Another contrast is between Taiwanese attitudes toward China's Sichuan earthquake in 2008 and Japan's disasters in 2011. Although Taiwanese people donated a huge amount of money to both countries, they strongly criticized the CCP's ill treatment for the victims and poor (even fake) coverage, but expressed praise to the responsible Japanese mass media and sober civil society. Again and again, many Taiwanese stated, "we should learn from Japan" and "we must keep a safe distance from China even there is indeed a strong trade ties." For them, as long as the new, modern nation-state of "Taiwan" is still under construction, the differentiation between "Japan" as an object of desire and "China" as a rejected Other will persist.

Indeed, identity is often defined as much by what we are *not* as by who we *are*. Through a process of "Othering," the "self" is defined in relation to the

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87 Denny Roy, *Taiwan: A Political History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 245.

characteristics of an "Other" culture. Most research on colonial (or de-colonial) identity deal with the binary opposition and negotiation between Self and Other. But in the case of Taiwan, the situation seems to be more complex. A "double Othering" appears to be ongoing: the Othering of China and the Othering of Taiwan itself, which is depicted as "the land of good old Japanese legacies" and "the *harizu*'s wonderland." If Jacques Lacan's "mirror" metaphor is persuasive—one identifies oneself by facing the mirror/other—many Taiwanese face two mirrors simultaneously: Japan and China. These mirrors arise from the entangled love and hate produced by complex and long-standing structures of feeling on the island.

(2) Comparing with the Post/colonial Experiences of Korea

Generally speaking, the critical difference between Taiwan and Korea centers on Korea's millennium of independence within well-recognized territorial boundaries, combined with ethnic homogeneity and pronounced ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences from its neighbors Japan and China. Furthermore, during World War II, millions of Koreans were transported to Japan, Manchuria and northern Korea to work as forced laborers in mines and factories. By contrast, Taiwan was never a nation, was usually seen as a remote Chinese frontier province and lacked centralized state control before the Japanese colonization. Thus the scale of mass resistance in Taiwan during the early colonization was smaller than in Korea. Until Japan's 1945 exit, only a relatively handful of Taiwanese had left the island for Japan or other colonies (most not forcibly mobilized), or even their native villages for Taipei.[88] However, the feeling of many older Taiwanese about the "less oppressive rule of Japan" and even their nostalgia for or identification with "Japan" was not based on a comparison with

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88 Bruce Cumings, "Colonial Formations and Deformations: Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam," in Prasenjit Duara (ed.), *Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then* (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 278-298.

the bitter reality of colonial Korea, but with the later KMT regime, as discussed in the afore-sections.

Between the 1950s and 1990s both Korea and Taiwan imposed very similar domestic bans on Japanese popular culture and on forced nationalist education which entailed cultural de-Japanization. However, as the aforesaid, civil strategies always operated in Taiwan below the level of state policy. Japan has in fact never gone away, since the Taiwanese have never ceased to desire, appropriate and imagine an array of contents and meanings of "Japan" through semi-public and even underground channels. Many Taiwanese remained on intimate terms with "Japan," and the lifting of the ban from the late 1980s thus went very smoothly. South Korea in contrast maintained a strict ban until 1998. It eventually opened the door to Japanese popular culture from the late 1990s, but deregulation was cautious and partial. Only the bans on Japanese films and live performances were lifted, but records containing Japanese language and Japanese TV dramas were still prohibited. From 2001, regulations were even tightened up to protest against Japan's governmental endorsement of a history textbook written by nationalist authors and Japanese Prime Minister's official visit to the Yasukuni Jinja to mourn the Emperor's soldiers.

While Koreans could not regularly watch Japanese TV dramas, Korean TV producers began, overtly or covertly, to learn from and take on the style of Japanese "trendy dramas." Donghoo Lee analyses how Korean TV producers have reworked—not only imitated but also creatively appropriated and transformed—Japanese trendy dramas within their own productions.[89] Recent Korean TV dramas have become very popular in Asian markets, including Japan. Although the number of Korean dramas is small compared to their Japanese

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89 Dong-hoo Lee, "Cultural Contact with Japanese TV Dramas: Modes of Reception and Narrative Transparency," in Iwabuchi Koichi (ed.), *Feeling Asian Modernities: Transnational Consumption of Japanese TV Dramas* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), pp. 251-274.

counterparts, their ratings are at times even higher than Japanese dramas in transnational markets.

Taiwan and Korea thus display similarities and differences in their engagement with "Japan" during different periods of the twentieth century. Comparative research on the "Japan" experience of the two (and other East Asian) countries could shine a revealing light on the complicated trajectories of post/coloniality and alternative/multiple modernities within East Asia. In other words, if modernity is "an attitude rather than an epoch,"[90] or in Michel Foucault's terms, "a mode of relating to contemporary reality,"[91] the modernities that most East Asian countries imagine and practice must involve their different cultural/historical relationships to contemporary Japan. These relationships embody the dialectics of converging, homogenizing, transcultural impulses as well as diverging, heterogenizing, multicultural effects, which operate simultaneously within the modern societies of these countries.

(3) Toward Post-hari?—Referring to "Japan," Rediscovering Taiwanese Self

During recent years, Taiwanese cultural products (TV dramas, pop music, publications, fashion etc.) become more and more competitive, often sweeping through the South-East Asia and Mainland China markets. From idea formation, to execution and marketing, Taiwanese producers skillfully appropriate "Japanese modes" to make their own products, and have thus come to play a successful role in portraying a highly modern lifestyle and hybrid culture in Chinese speaking areas.

Such triumphs of the Taiwanese cultural industries have also drawn much attention in Japan. Many popular texts directly constructed/facilitated the

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90 Jenny Kwok Wah Lau (ed.), *Multiple Modernities: Cinemas and Popular Media in Transcultural East Asia* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), p. 3.
91 Michel Foucault, "Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth," in Paul Rabinow (ed.), *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984*, Vol. I (New York: New Press, 1997), p. 303.

Japanese tourist gaze on Taiwan. For instance, in order to expand its market share in Taiwan, Japan's KIRIN Beer invited the director Hou Hiaoxian 侯孝賢 to film a series of commercials. Hou skillfully employed a *nakasi*-style Mingnanese duet as the theme song and created a sensational ad slogan. KIRIN has quickly become the best-loved imported beer and the theme song made best-selling. And later, in Japan, it also successfully created a topic of conversation and led to new cross-cultural consumption associated with the search for "authentic Taiwan," such as listening to Mingnanese songs, drinking in a "Taiwanese way," travelling to the mountain towns like Jiufen, and so on.

Indeed, through more and more cultural consumption associated with "Taiwan"—from media reception to travel experience—more and more young Japanese have become interested in things Taiwanese, but in a quite different way from the older "pro-Taiwan" Japanese who nostalgically idealize Taiwan as a repository of "good old Japaneseness." Generally speaking, young Japanese like Taiwan because it expresses a hybridized modern culture, cordial atmosphere and intimate feeling, as a Japanese newspaper editorial concludes.[92] The new term "*hataizu*" (Taiwanophiles, 哈臺族), derived from *harizu* and coined by Japanese journalists, refers to young Japanese who are enthusiastic about Taiwan. We must think twice before celebrating the emerging "*hatai*" phenomena in Japan as a counteraction against Japanese cultural domination, but we should keep a close eye on the future spread of Taiwanese popular culture in Japan. Such ongoing diffusion of modern Taiwanese culture, generously blending "Japanese elements," and its transnational cultural-political influence in Japan are topics of compelling interest.

The above phenomena could be regarded as part of a process of *transculturation*, in which cultural settings gradually move through time and space where they interact with other cultural settings, influence each other, and

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92 *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* [*Japan Economy News*] 日本經濟新聞, Jan. 18, 2002.

produce new cultural contents. Such cultural crossings are made possible, in particular, by transnational media and cross-cultural consumption. The Taiwanese cultural industries are making their presence felt and the so-called *hatai* are spreading in Japan. Many Taiwanese *harizu* are aware of this and are beginning reflectively to develop new attitudes towards their birthplace, Taiwan. As Ulf Hannerz points out:

> The transnational cultures are bridgeheads for entry into other territorial cultures. Instead of remaining within them, one can use the mobility connected with them to make contact with the meanings of other rounds of life, and gradually incorporate this experience into one's personal perspective.[93]

Hannerz's argument reveals the dialectic dynamics of transculturation, an always push-and-pull process. Transnational connections do not fully replace existing national boundaries, thoughts and feelings. Rather, as Roger Rouse argues, "the transnational has not so much displaced the national as resituated it and thus reworked its meanings."[94] This is particularly important when considering the possibility of a post-*hari* Taiwan. In a national survey conducted by Academia Sinica in 2002, 57 percent of Taiwanese felt that the cultures of all the nations in the world would become increasingly similar—a clear sign of their consciousness of global homogeneity and sameness. But in the same survey, 65 percent responded that despite world cultural convergence, Taiwan must retain its own cultural characteristics—a call for cultural uniqueness.[95] These findings seem highly ambivalent at first sight. However, they dovetail with the well-

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93 Ulf Hannerz, *Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 108.
94 Roger Rouse, "Thinking through Transnationalism: Notes on the Cultural Politics of Class Relations in the Contemporary United States," *Public Culture*, 7, 2 (1995), p. 353.
95 Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao, "Coexistence and Synthesis: Cultural Globalization and Localization in Contemporary Taiwan," in Peter L. Berger and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 58.

acknowledged *glocalization* thesis, which emphasizes the necessary coexistence of global/transnational and local cultures and identities.

Since the Taiwanese has experienced such "glocality," are there any indications that a post-*hari* culture is forming, or more precisely, what is next step for the Taiwanese Japanophiles? On the one hand, through frequent and intensive media reception and representation, cross-cultural consumption and travel or language study, Taiwanese *harizu* constantly imagine, desire, experience and absorb miscellaneous cultural contents of Japan. On the other hand, stimulated by the recent transnational conjunction of Taiwanese *hari* and Japanese *hatai*, many Taiwanese *harizu* have been motivated to re-discover Taiwanese local culture and history, more actively discoursing on and searching for "Taiwanness," and more proud to identify themselves as "Taiwanese" who have a specifically hybrid culture, thus different from "the Chinese" even though they are "ethnically" the same. Lee Ming-tsung demonstrated that the majority of young Taiwanese *harizu* exhibit a hybridized cultural orientation rather than merely identification with Japan.[96] Although they are indeed fond of Japanese culture, they retain a clear consciousness of "being Taiwanese." Thus recent Japanese *hatai* provide some reflective hints for *harizu* to rethink the culture of their own country. Even the "*hari* founder/leader" Hari Kyoko, the representative figure of the "excessive" *harizu*, expresses how she has developed a dual *hari-hatai* identity in an interview with *Asahi Simbun Weekly*:

> Frankly, I rarely felt how good it is to be Taiwanese before I went to Japan. But since I have got to know Japan more and more deeply and made many Japanese friends, many of whom are *hataizu*, I have gradually and unexpectedly become aware of the advantages of we

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96 Lee Ming-tsung, "From Tourist Gaze to Sojourning Practice: A Comparative Ethnographic Study of Taiwanese Students in Tokyo and Japanese Students in Taipei 從觀光凝視到旅居實作：一個臺灣和日本遊學生的比較民族誌研究," *Journal of Outdoor Recreation Study* 戶外遊憩研究, 27, 4 (Dec., 2014), pp. 93-122.

> Taiwanese. In other words, paradoxically but truly, the more Japanese things I learn, the more Taiwanese things I am interested in. Now *hari* and *hatai* have become two sides of the same coin to me.[97]

This subtle transformation cannot be attributed solely to individual reflection: Taiwan's democratization and the rise of Taiwanese nationalist discourse laid the foundation for it. The changing political climate has greatly facilitated and inspired Taiwan's cultural reconstruction and revitalization—a move to establish a cultural foundation for the new nation-building imagination. The most important and typical example over the last two decades is the rewriting of Taiwanese history and reinterpretation of the Japanese colonial achievement in local academic circles, where there is a movement away from Chineseness towards re-discovering so-called Taiwaneseness.

In short, as *glocalization* has progressed, Taiwanese society has responded both by developing an indigenized consumer culture and through conscious efforts to re/construct Taiwanese cultural identities. Though Japanese popular culture dominates in Taiwanese life, it not only coexists with localization but has facilitated the growth of cultural diversity and the search for cultural specifics in Taiwan. As Giddens points out, the "active processes of reflexive self-identity are made possible by modernity."[98] The modern Taiwanese appropriation of the Other's culture to construct Taiwanese identity and culture can be traced back at least to the colonial modernity imposed by the Japanese in the first half of the twentieth century. Since then, "Japan" has never disappeared from Taiwan. Although the shadow of "Japan" is almost everywhere in Taiwan, "Japanization" is not an all-or-nothing process.

For many Taiwanese, "Japan" has played multiple, complex roles: colonizer, oppressor, instructor and competitor, primary object for imagining, learning and

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97 *Asahi Simbun Weekly*, Feb. 19, 2002, p. 51.
98 Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 150.

competing with, the main resource for practicing multiple modernities, the key alternative to dominant Americanization and essentialized Chineseness, as well as the main reference for constructing a Taiwanese identity. Even if Taiwanese society moves towards a post-*hari* period, "Japan" is constantly absorbing (fascinating and attracting) in Taiwan and is continuously absorbed by the Taiwanese. Meanwhile, Taiwanese are absorbed in molding their cultural hybridity into a new identity in this "glocalized" age.♦

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