

Feature Article 【專題論文】

New Approach of Indigenous Social Psychology
in the Age of Globalization
全球化時代本土社會心理學研究的新取向

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Abstract

The epistemological goal of indigenous psychology is to construct a series of formal theoretical models which should be able to represent the universal structure of human minds on the one hand, and account for people's specific mentalities in indigenous culture on the other hand. In order to attain this goal, three levels of breakthrough must be made for the sustainable progress of indigenous psychology: philosophical reflection, theoretical construction, and empirical research. In my book *Confucian Relationalism*, I explained how I constructed the Face and Favor model which may reflect the deep structure of universal human mind for dealing with interpersonal relationships. Then I used it as a framework to analyze the inner structure of Confucianism which might enable us to understand the specific mentality of people living in Confucian society. The attributes of Confucian ethics were analyzed from the perspective of modern ethics, and a series of mini-theories had been constructed on the presumption of relationalism to integrate findings of previous empirical researches on social exchange, achievement motivation, concept of face, *quanxi* and organizational behaviors, and strategies of conflict resolution in Confucian society. Through the efforts of this book, it is expected that we may not only achieve the epistemological goals of indigenous psychology, but also establish the research tradition of Confucian relationalism in social psychology.

摘要

本土心理學的知識論目標是建構一系列的形式性理論，它們既能夠反映人類心智普遍的結構，又能夠說明本土文化中特有的心態。為了達成這樣的目標，本土心理學在持續發展的過程中必須作三個層次的突破：哲學的反思、理論建構和實徵研究。《儒家關係主義》一書首先說明我如何建構〈人情與面子〉的理論模型，以反映人類處理人際關係的普遍心智；再以之作為架構，分析儒家思想的內在結構，藉以瞭解儒家社會中人們特有的心態；並從現代倫理學的觀點，說明儒家倫理的屬性，再以之作為預設，建構出一系列的理論，來整合儒家社會中有關社會交換、成就動機、臉面觀念、關係與組織行為、以及衝突化解的實徵研究。藉由這樣的努力，希望不僅能達到本土心理學的知識論目標，而且能夠建立社會心理學中儒家關係主義的研究傳統。

Since the end of the 1970s, some psychologists have begun conducting research on the indigenous psychology of non-Western countries, such as Mexico, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and India. This trend attracted increasing attention from mainstream psychologists in the 1990s. The emergence of indigenous psychology can be understood as a search by non-Western psychologists for cultural identity in the power structure of the new world order.

In the beginning of the 1990s, the communist countries of Eastern Europe collapsed, and the long-lasting cold war between East and West that had persisted since the end of World War II came to an end. Many previously communist countries began to participate in the competition of the world market of capitalism, especially the People's Republic of China, whose leaders have been devoted to economic reform since the mid-1970s. Chinese products penetrate the world market. China's huge population also constitutes an attractive market for most international businesses. Globalization has become an inevitable trend, and the concept of multi-culturalism has accordingly been proposed as globalization's opposite but matching concept. People need to understand people from various different cultures, and yet they also need to seek their own cultural identities. As a consequence of frequent cultural contact, the possibility of intercultural conflict has also increased. Various types of interracial or international conflict have broken out in many regions around the world, and the clash of civilizations has become a core issue for human beings to resolve in the new age of globalization.¹

I. Indigenization Movement of Psychology

Indigenous psychology has emerged in this new power structure of world politics and economy. Generally speaking, indigenization movements have been

¹ S. Huntington, *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order* (New York: Simon & Schuster).

initiated by non-Western psychologists in a spirit of nationalism and academic anti-colonialism. They have argued that current mainstream psychology is basically a kind of Westernized or Americanized psychology. Both its theory and research methods contain Western ethnocentric bias.² When the research paradigm of Western psychology is transplanted blindly to non-Western countries, it is usually irrelevant, inappropriate, or incompatible for understanding the mentalities of non-Western people.³ Such a practice has been regarded as a kind of academic imperialism or colonialism.⁴ By ignoring the fact that many Western theories of social psychology are culturally bound, duplication of a Western paradigm in non-Western countries may result in neglect of cultural factors that may influence the development and manifestation of human behavior.

Based on such reasoning, many indigenous psychologists have advocated "a bottom-up model building paradigm"⁵ to promote "the study of human behavior and mental processes within a cultural context that relies on values, concepts, belief systems, methodologies, and other resources,"⁶ and that treats people "as interactive and proactive agents of their own actions" that occur in a meaningful context.⁷ They perform "the scientific study of human behavior (or the mind) that is native, that is not transported from other regions, and that is designed for its peoples"⁸ in order to develop a "cultural-appropriate psychology,"⁹ "a

2 J. W. Berry, Y. H. Poortinga, M. H. Segall, and P. R. Dasen, *Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

3 D. Sinha, *Psychology in a third world country: The Indian Experience* (New Delhi: Sage, 1986); D. Sinha, "Indigenisation of psychology in India and its relevance," *The Indian Journal of Social Science*, 1 (1988), pp. 77-91.

4 D. Y. F. Ho, "Relational orientation in Asian social psychology," in U. Kim & J. W. Berry (eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993), pp. 240-259.

5 U. Kim, "Indigenous, cultural, and cross-cultural psychology: A theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological analysis," *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 3, 3 (2000), p. 265.

6 D. Y. F. Ho, "Indigenous psychologies: Asian perspectives," *Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology*, 29, 1 (1998), p. 94.

7 U. Kim, Y. S. Park and D. Park, "The challenger of cross-cultural psychology: The role of the indigenous psychologies," *Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology*, 31, 1 (2000), p. 71.

8 U. Kim and J. Berry (eds.), *Indigenous cultural psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993), p. 2.

9 H. Azuma, "Psychology in a non-Western country," *International Journal of Psychology*, 19, 1,

psychology based on and responsive to indigenous culture and indigenous realities"¹⁰ or a psychology whose "concepts, problems, hypothesis, methods, and tests emanate from, adequately represent, and reflect upon the cultural context in which the behavior is observed."¹¹

II. Challenges to Indigenous Psychology

The indigenous psychology approach just described has been criticized by mainstream psychologists. For example, Triandis pointed out that anthropologists have used a similar approach for years, and that accumulating anthropological data with an idiosyncratic approach may not have much significance in terms of contribution to the development of scientific psychology.¹² Poortinga indicated that the restriction for development of indigenous psychology is implied in the usage of the plural "indigenous psychologies" by many indigenous psychologists.¹³ The development of multiple psychologies not only contradicts the scientific requirement of parsimony, but also makes the demarcation of cultural populations a pending problem. If every culture has to develop its own psychology, how many indigenous psychologies should there be? How many psychologies would have to be developed for Africa? What is the optimal number of indigenous psychologies? What is the meaning of an indigenous psychology developed in a specific culture to people in other cultures?

(1984), p. 53.

- 10 V. Enriquez, "Developing a Filipino psychology," in U. Kim & J. Berry, *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993), p. 158.
- 11 J. G. Adair, B. N. Puhana and N. Vohra, "Indigenous of psychology: Empirical assessment of progress in Indian research," *International Journal of Psychology*, 28 (1993), p. 149.
- 12 H. C. Triandis, "Dialectics between cultural and cross-cultural psychology," *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 3, 3 (2000), pp. 185-195.
- 13 Y. H. Poortinga, "Do differences in behavior imply a need for different psychologies?" *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 48, 4 (1999), pp. 419-432.

David Ho, a supporter of indigenous psychology, advocated the development of an Asian psychology,¹⁴ but also pointed out that if every culture develops its own psychology, another kind of ethnocentrism in reverse would arise. Poortinga made a similar criticism, arguing that over-emphasis on the nature and extent of differences in psychological functioning between people of different cultures may make indigenous psychology a kind of "scientific ethnocentrism in a new guise."¹⁵

Hermans and Kempen proposed the concept of "moving culture," which emphasizes the fact that cultures change over time, and discussed the perils of proposing cultural dichotomies in a globalizing society.¹⁶ When intercultural communications become so frequent that the whole world is a global village, can culture be regarded as internally homogenous and externally distinctive? If individuals are able to choose their own behavior, culture may have no necessary influence on the individual, and psychological traits and mechanisms would be incidental. The notion of regarding culture as a psychological system becomes less feasible. Instead of regarding culture as a stable system geographically located in a particular area, it would be more viable to define cross-cultural differences in terms of specific ecocultural and sociocultural conditions.¹⁷

Poortinga strongly suggested that "differences in behavioral repertoires across cultural populations should be understood against the background of a broader frame of commonness."¹⁸ He argued that over-emphasis on cross-cultural differences in behaviors and negation of important invariance in

14 D. Y. F. Ho, "Asian psychology: A dialogue on indigenization and beyond," in A. C. Paranjpe, D. Y. F. Ho, & R. W. Rieber (eds.), *Asian contributions to psychology* (New York: Praeger, 1988), pp. 53-77.

15 Y. H. Poortinga, "Indigenous psychology: Scientific ethnocentrism in a new guise?" in J. Pandey, D. Sinha, & D. P. S. Bhawuk (eds.), *Asian contributions to cross-cultural psychology* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996), p. 59.

16 J. M. Hermans and J. G. Kempen, "Moving cultures: The perilous problem of cultural dichotomy in a globalized society," *American Psychologist*, 53, 10 (1998), pp. 1111-1120.

17 Y. H. Poortinga, "Do differences in behavior imply a need for different psychologies?" *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 48, 4 (1999), pp. 419-432.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 425

psychological functioning across different cultures is not only "factually incorrect," but also "theoretically misleading".¹⁹

III. The Epistemological Goal of Indigenous Psychology

In order to respond to these challenges, most indigenous psychologists have argued that the development of numerous indigenous psychologies is not their final goal. Rather, their final goal is to develop an Asian psychology (Ho, 1988),²⁰ a global psychology,²¹ a universal psychology,²² or a human psychology.²³ To achieve this goal, they have proposed several research methods or approaches, including the derived etic approach,²⁴ the metatheory method,²⁵ the cross-indigenous method,²⁶ as well as the cross-cultural indigenous psychology.²⁷

19 Ibid, p. 419.

20 D. Y. F. Ho, "Asian psychology: A dialogue on indigenization and beyond," in A. C. Paranjpe, D. Y. F. Ho, & R. W. Rieber (eds.), *Asian contributions to psychology* (New York: Praeger, 1988), pp. 53-77.

21 V. Enriquez, "Developing a Filipino psychology," in U. Kim & J. Berry, *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993), pp. 152-169; K. S. Yang, "Why do we need to develop an indigenous Chinese psychology?" (in Chinese) *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies*, 1 (1993), pp. 6-88.

22 U. Kim and J. Berry (eds.), *Indigenous cultural psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993), pp. 1-29.

23 K. S. Yang, "Why do we need to develop an indigenous Chinese psychology?" (in Chinese) *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies*, 1 (1993), pp. 6-88.

24 J. W. Berry, "Imposed etics-emics-derived etics: The operationalization of a compelling idea," *International Journal of Psychology*, 24 (1989), pp. 721-735; J. W. Berry & U. Kim, "The way ahead: From indigenous psychologies to a universal psychology," in U. Kim & J. W. Berry (eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993), pp. 277-280.

25 D. Y. F. Ho, "Indigenous psychologies: Asian perspectives," *Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology*, 29, 1 (1998), pp. 88-103.

26 V. Enriquez, "Filipino psychology in the Third World," *Philippine Journal of Psychology*, 10 (1977), pp. 3-18; V. Enriquez, "Developing a Filipino psychology," in U. Kim & J. Berry, *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993), pp. 152-169.

27 K. S. Yang, "Indigenous compatibility in psychological research and its related problems," (in Chinese) *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies*, 8 (1997), pp. 75-120; K. S. Yang, "Towards an indigenous Chinese psychology: A selective review of methodological,

The transition from indigenous psychologies to an Asian psychology, global psychology, universal psychology or a human psychology, implies a significant change in philosophical assumptions. Indigenous psychologists must change their ontology, epistemology, as well as methodology if they want to attain this goal.

On this point, I strongly agree with Greenfield, who delivered the following statement in her keynote speech to the 3rd Conference of Asian Social Psychology in Taipei, August, 1999:

The incorporation of culture into mainstream psychology will not come from simply presenting data on group differences, no matter how exciting or dramatic these differences may be. My most important theoretical mission is to introduce the idea of a *deep structure of culture*. As in language, deep structure of culture generates behaviors and interpretations of human behavior in an infinite array of domains and situations. I believe that the concepts behind individualism and collectivism, independence and interdependence, a relational vs. an individual orientation and so on are all indexing a common deep structure.²⁸

But, how are researchers to identify the common deep structures of the human mind? In order to answer this question, the concept of deep structure must be expanded from the perspective of structuralism.

theoretical, and empirical accomplishments," *Chinese Journal of Psychology*, 41 (1999), pp. 181-211.

28 P. M. Greenfield, "Three approaches to the psychology of culture: Where do they come from? Where can they go?" *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 3, 3 (2000), p. 229.

IV. Confucianism Relationalism

This is a really complicated issue. Since I constructed the "Face and Favor" model in early 1980s, I have devoted myself to the development of indigenous Chinese psychology. Since I was appointed as the principal investigator of the project entitled "In Search of Excellence for Chinese Indigenous Psychological Research" in 2000, I have paid close attention to issues related to this goal, engaged in conducting psychological research, and published a series of papers in attempt to resolve these issues. In the annual evaluations on the performance of this project, examiners from the Ministry of Education and the National Science Council have always pointed out that each of my published papers has its justified arguments. But, how can I integrate those arguments together to illustrate my advocacy of the development of indigenous psychology or indigenous social science?

This book entitled *Confucian Relationalism* is indeed my response to this request. In my article "The epistemological goal of indigenous psychology,"²⁹ I emphasized that three levels of breakthrough must be made for the sustainable progress of indigenous psychology: philosophical reflection, theoretical construction, and empirical research. This book contains 12 chapters; the first chapter elaborates the epistemology strategy of indigenous psychology with a reference to the content of this book.

1. Philosophical reflection

For the task of philosophical reflection, I suggest that the indigenous psychologist has to consider a fundamental question: what is the meaning of modernization for non-Western countries? There are reasons modernization

29 K. K. Hwang, "The epistemological goal of indigenous psychology: The perspective of constructive realism," in B. N. Setiadi, A. Supratiknya, W. J. Lonner, and Y. H. Poortinga (eds.), *Ongoing themes in psychology and culture. The International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology* (2004), pp. 169-186.

theory gained popularity in many fields of social science in non-Western countries after the end of World War II up to the late 1970s. However, the book did not take the position of personality psychology; I have no interest in asking how to study, to measure, or even to develop the personality traits of modern man. On the contrary, I advocate that, as social scientists in non-Western societies, we should ask the question: what are the essential differences between the knowledge created by scientists after the Renaissance Movement in Europe and the knowledge developed by various cultures over history of human beings?

Constructive Realism

In other words, it is unlikely to find a standard modern man, but it is certain that we are able to define what is modern knowledge in terms of the Western philosophy of science. I published a book entitled *The Logic of Social Sciences* in early 2000.³⁰ This book systematically introduced the ontology / epistemology / methodology proposed by 17 major Western philosophers during 20th century. Its content is divided into five major parts: (1) Positivism, (2) Post Positivism, (3) Structuralism, (4) Hermeneutics, and (5) Critical Theory, with the last chapter on Constructive Realism as its conclusion. The Positivism and Post Positivism introduced in the first two parts of the book are philosophies applicable to natural science. Because most psychologists have defined psychology as a science, both of these two philosophies have frequently been used by psychologists. The paradigms of Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Critical Theory as discussed in the latter three parts, they are often adopted by social scientists. The Constructive Realism described in the last chapter is a philosophy of science advocated by Professor Dr. Fritz Wallner of the University of Vienna. In recent years, he organized the Vienna School, in distinction from the Vienna Circle which was very active in the scientific community of the world in 1930s, with the goal of the

30 K. K. Hwang, *The Logics of Social Science* (in Chinese) (Taipei: Psychological Publishers, 2001).

development of the philosophy of science since the 20th century. Constructive Realism divides reality into three categories: reality itself cannot be understood by human beings. Human being can understand only the lifeworld constructed by a certain cultural group with their mother language in their history, as well as the scientific microworld constructed by a certain scientist with their professional terminology.

It seems to me that, the distinction between scientific microworld and lifeworld made by Constructive Realism is crucially important for us to resolve problems encountered in developing indigenous psychology. Nevertheless, the descriptions of these two worlds provided by Constructive Realism are not enough for us to attain this goal, therefore, in Chapter 2 "Modernization of Non-Western Societies: A Perspective of Constructive Realism," I compare differences of knowledge between these two worlds from five aspects, namely, constructor, ways of thinking, types of rationality, mode of construction, and functions of worldview, in order to describe the characteristics of modern knowledge which can be used to explain the modernization of non-Western societies.

Philosophical Switch

From such a comparison and exposition, it can be seen that the modernization of Western societies has emerged from the inner core of their civilization, while the modernization of non-Western societies is a consequence of transplanting the essence of Western civilization from outside. In order to develop indigenous social sciences, social scientists of non-Western societies not only have to renounce the mentality of colonialism which is characterized with a blind transplantation of Western research paradigms, but also to adjust their mentality from anticolonialism to postcolonialism.³¹ They must absorb the essence of Western civilization, and learn how to use the philosophy of science as

31 K. K. Hwang, "From anticolonialism to postcolonialism: The emergence of Chinese indigenous psychology in Taiwan," *International Journal of Psychology*, 40, 4 (2005), pp. 228-238.

a basis for constructing scientific microworld which is applicable to domestic society.

Therefore, in Chapter 3 "The Concepts of Person and Paradigm Switch in Western Philosophy," I cite the arguments of French philosopher François Jullien, make a clear distinction between modern Western philosophy and traditional Eastern wisdom, and discuss the evolution of Western philosophy from the concepts of person implied in the philosophies proposed by Aristotle, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Popper. My discussion is focused on the major paradigm shift from Positivism to Post-Positivism. Several important scientific philosophies of science which appeared after the rise of Post-Positivism are introduced in expectation that they may help psychologists of non-Western societies to grasp rules of the game for constructing a scientific microworld.

2. Theoretical construct

Based on Western philosophy of science, we can investigate the question: how to achieve the epistemological goals of indigenous psychology? Before doing so, first we have to clarify such questions as: What is structure? And what is deep structure?

People in Nature

From the perspective of structuralism (Lévi-Strauss, 1976), the formation and variation of cultural phenomenon have evolved from the universal structure of the human mind.³² Human beings are a part of nature; human cognitions and behavior are profoundly influenced by nature. Nature is sensible. All phenomena in nature operate in accordance with objective rules. Those rules are connected with one another, so as to make the whole of nature a united entity over a long

32 Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural anthropology*, trans by M.Layton (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

period of time. The stability of natural rules over time and their linkage across space have long-term influence on human beings, Human social lives are conditioned by the operation of nature.

For the sake of survival and prosperity, human rationality has to handle the various events encountered in a person's lifeworld in terms of bipolar cognitive dimensions so as to adjust to the environment. In view of the development of human culture, all human activities, including cognitions as well as actions, result from simulating various relations in nature. Nature is a system with steady, unchangeable, and mutually linked relations among its various components. The diversified social phenomena seen in a given society are manifested from an undetectable underlying structure that originated from the inherited capability of the human mind.

As a part of nature, from generation to generation people have gradually developed various sets of customs in their lifeworlds that are congruent with the natural order. These customs, rites, and various forms of life are the consequences of routinization, crystallization, or systematization of human practices in simulation of nature. The network of relations between people and nature or between people and people is the structure.

Pre-modern Civilization

Pre-modern civilizations that evolved from primitive cultures were created unconsciously with a psychological mechanism synchronous with nature. The creative mechanism of pre-modern civilization was neither rationality in opposition to nature, nor the process of evolution as described by historians, but the principle of maintaining homeostasis by simulating the operation of nature. Like the stability and certainty of the natural order, there exists a stable structure underlying every pre-modern civilization created by human beings. Various types of culture manifested in different historical stages are merely the independent

performance of the same inherited capability of human minds in different circumstances, like the fossils buried in different stratum of the earth they share the same structure.

The human capability to simulate nature is manifest in the customs and social relationships of pre-modern civilization. The more advanced the society, the more progressed the civilization, and the more complicated the social relationships. Many linkages among people depart from the natural order, which makes recognition of the original appearance of some pre-modern civilizations difficult. The goal of structuralism is to reveal the fundamental structure of cultural relations that might be very complicated in appearance. These structures are the unconscious models of human rationality, which are a kind of autonomous model followed by human thinking. All of the empirical facts in human social life are a result of the arrangement and combination of these models.

According to structuralism, language is the basis of social structure. An individual who wants to connect with others must first separate himself from others, and then exchange messages with others through a linguistic or symbolic system. The structure of language is the prototype of social structure. All social life and cultural activities are constructed on the basis of the deep structure of language. Use of language and social exchange behavior links people as a social entity, enabling them to depart from nature, and to form their own cultural systems.

Deep Structure of Universal Mind

With this understanding of the fundamental position of structuralism, I return to the context of this thesis, and explain the importance of studying the deep structure of a culture in indigenous psychology. From the perspective of structuralism, both the language games played by people in their lifeworlds and

the microworlds of knowledge constructed by scientists have their own structures. But, there are tremendous differences between these two kinds of structure. In terms of Piaget's genetic epistemology, the structure of scientific knowledge is a conscious model constructed with formal operational thinking by an individual scientist with fully developed intelligence.³³ In contrast, the language games played by people in their lifeworlds are constituted by the rationality of a cultural group under the influence of their collective unconscious over the history of their evolution. These language games originate from the deep structure of the culture, which is an unconscious model. People are unaware of it directly in their daily lives, but researchers may reveal the deep structure using the methods of structuralism.

Unconscious Model

In accordance with Greenfield's point of view, the most important academic mission of indigenous psychology is to reveal the deep structure of culture, and transform it from structure of unconscious to that of conscious by utilizing the research methods of Western social science, then use it as a framework of reference to construct various theories of psychology, for conducting empirical research in the lifeworld of domestic society.³⁴

Chapter 4 "Theoretical Construction of Face and Favor Model" aims to explain how I perform critical review over Western theories of social exchange, equity theory, and justice theory, and construct the theoretical model of Face and Favor on the basis of philosophy of science. In this chapter, I want to emphasize that the theoretical model thus constructed may reflect the deep structure of universal human mind for dealing with interpersonal relationships.

33 J. Piaget, *The Principle of Genetic Epistemology*, W. Mays (trans.) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Rawls, 1972, 1981).

34 P. M. Greenfield, "Three approaches to the psychology of culture: Where do they come from? Where can they go?" *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 3, 3 (2000), pp. 223-240.

Chapter 5 analyzes the inner structure of Confucian thoughts by using the theoretical model of Face and Favor as a framework of reference. Such an analysis enables us to see that there exists an isomorphic relationship between the theoretical model of Face and Favor and the Confucian ethics for ordinary people. From the theoretical model of Face and Favor, we can see the universal human mind for dealing with interpersonal relationships. From the Confucian ethics for ordinary people, we can understand the specific mentality of people living in Confucian society.

3. Empirical research

The theoretical model of Face and Favor and the Confucian ethics for ordinary people constitute the core of Confucian relationalism. Viewing from Popper's evolutionary epistemology, any scientist may construct a theory to explain a certain phenomenon in a particular domain.³⁵ The theories constructed by different scientists for explaining the same phenomenon will compete with one another, therefore, they must be examined through rational critique and empirical test.

Attributes of Confucian Ethics

There were many psychologists who have studied moral thinking in Chinese community by different research paradigms. Chapter 6, "Paradigms for Studying Chinese Moral Thinkings: Meta-Theoretical Analysis," aims to provide a critical review of findings of previous researches following these paradigms. Chapter 7, "Moral Thoughts in Confucian Society," tries to analyze the attributes of Confucian ethics from my perspective of ethics, and to re-interpret findings of previous research done in Taiwan which could not be adequately explained by

35 K. Popper, *Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).

Western theories. The analysis of Confucian thoughts presented in this chapter is a key for understanding the uniqueness of Confucian culture, which deserves our special attention.

Chapter 8 presents a series of empirical research results which have been accomplished on the basis of Confucian relationalism. From the point of view of the philosophy of science, a scientist may construct a theory to explain a phenomenon in a certain domain with a set of specific presumptions. Previous theories and research paradigms proposed by Western psychologists were mostly constructed on the presumption of individualism. Based on the presumption of rationalism, a series of theories can certainly be constructed serve as guidelines for empirical research on one hand, and to explain findings of previous empirical researches on the other hand. Chapters 9 to 12 construct a series of mini-theories to integrate findings of previous empirical researches on achievement motivation, face, *quanxi*, and strategies of conflict resolution in Confucian society.

Following the same logic, a series of relevant theories on phenomenon of other domains in Confucian society can further be constructed. Through the efforts of the book, I hope we may not only achieve the epistemological goals of indigenous psychology, but also establish the research tradition of Confucian relationalism in social science.♦

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