

On the Place of the Study on Confucianism in
Max Weber's Work
儒學研究在韋伯作品中之地位

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Keywords: Max Weber, comparative and developmental analysis, *Economy and Society*, *Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion*, the place of the study of Confucianism, comparison between early China and Greece

關鍵詞：馬克斯·韋伯、比較與發展分析、《經濟與社會》、《宗教社會學文集》、儒學研究之地位、古代中國與希臘比較

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Abstract

Max Weber's (1864-1920) study on Confucianism, dealt with in this essay, was first published in a journal in 1915, then, in an extended version, as a chapter in volume 1 of the *Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion* in 1920. It is here embedded in the development of *Economy and Society* and the *Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion* as well as in their interrelationship. It is shown that the study on Confucianism serves a double purpose in Weber's overall writings. From a systematic point of view, Confucianism can be regarded as a border case within a sociology and typology of religious rationalism. From a point of view of developmental history, it can be regarded a backdrop, against which the uniqueness of the Western trajectory is depicted. In Weber's view, Confucian scholarship shares some common elements with Greek scholarship. Both lack the ideas of salvation and prophesy. Whereas in the West Greek philosophy merged with Christianity, a salvation religion, in China Confucianism remained untouched by the idea of salvation. Therefore, Confucianism rationalized world affirmation rather than world rejection and did not create the same deep seated conflicts between this world and the world beyond, which caused a peculiar dynamic in the West.

摘要

馬克斯·韋伯（1864-1920）關於儒學的研究，初刊於一九一五年一份期刊中，後經擴充，收入出版於一九二〇年的《宗教社會學文集》第一冊裡。這當中五年，實際上體現了從《經濟與社會》到《宗教社會學文集》的觀點發展，以及兩者間之關聯。在韋伯的整體作品中，儒學研究具有雙重目的。從系統的觀點來說，儒學可作為關於宗教理性主義之社會學及形態學的個案；從發展式的歷史觀點來說，儒學適足以提供一個背景，藉以突出西方的獨特性。據韋伯觀察，儒學與希臘學說有某些相似之處，即兩者都缺乏救贖和預言的概念。然而在西方，希臘哲學後來與救贖式宗教的基督教相結合，中國卻始終未受到救贖觀念影響。因此，儒學對世界持肯定而非棄絕的態度，西方卻由於俗世和超越界的衝突形成獨特的歷史動力。

Preface

Max Weber's (1864-1920) study on Confucianism, unfortunately published in English as a separate book and under the misleading title *The Religion of China*, is particularly well-suited to shedding light on the approach of his *mature* sociology of religion. On this study he worked after 1910 in two phases—the first most likely in 1912 and 1913, the second in 1919—the results of which he published in 1915 and in 1920 respectively. Having devoted himself at the beginning of his academic career to "Mediterranean" antiquity and the Medieval Ages as well as to the emergence of modern agrarian capitalism in a comparative perspective, his focus rested on the Near East and the West. Asia proper remained largely untouched. Neither in "The Protestant Ethic and the 'Spirit' of Capitalism," the sequel of essays of 1904 and 1905, nor in any other study before 1910 we find more than sporadic remarks on Asia. It was only after 1910 that he dealt with religious developments in China, India and to a certain extent in Japan.¹ As we know from Weber's correspondence and from footnotes in his writings, he must have written down his first insights into these developments in 1913, pursuing the line of reasoning he had established in his studies on ascetic Protestantism.² In the course of his scientific work after 1915, he extended this

1 It is noteworthy, however, that Weber turned to East Asia already in his lecture course on "Practical Economics," which he delivered before the turn of the century and before his breakdown. In this lecture course he pointed to the "entry of East Asia into the orbit of Western culture," but only from an economic, not from a religious point of view. In a short passage he compared Japan with China. He depicted Japan as a feudal state, China as a patrimonial state. See Max Weber, *Praktische Nationalökonomie. Vorlesungen 1895-1899* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]), MWG III/2, forthcoming. MWG means Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe (Max Weber's Complete Works). I covers writings and speeches, II letters, III lectures

2 See the letter of Max Weber to his publisher Paul Siebeck, dated June 22, 1915: "I am willing to provide the 'Archive' [*Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*] with a series of essays on the 'Economic Ethic of the World-Religions', which sit here since the beginning of the war and which have to be revised only stylistically [...] and which apply the method developed in the essay 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism' in a general way." Max Weber, *Briefe 1915-1917* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 2008), S. 69f. (MWG II/9).

line of reasoning especially with regard to the structural and institutional conditions.

I shall deal with my topic in three steps: I shall start with remarks on the major projects, on which Max Weber was working from 1910 until his death, and which remained unfinished. These were his Grundriss article, known as *Economy and Society (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft)*, and his *Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion (Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie)*³ (1). This will be followed by reflections on his peculiar combination of comparative and developmental viewpoints, which underlies his reconstitution of major processes in religious history (2). Then I shall try to show how Weber linked his study on ascetic Protestantism with his study on Confucianism in 1915, a linkage, he maintained in 1920. In doing so, I will compare Weber's interpretation of (classical) Confucianism with his interpretation of the classical period of ancient Greece to illustrate why he considered a mundane ethic of intellectuals unfit to change mentalities radically from within (3).

1. The Uncompleted Major Projects

It is well known that Max Weber's scholarly interests from 1910 until his death focused on two major projects, which gradually became distinct and then developed separately: (1) the contribution to the *Handbook of Political Economy (Handbuch der politischen Oekonomie)*, later renamed *Outline of Social Economics (Grundriß der Sozialökonomik)*, which he entitled first "Economy and Society," ("Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft"), then "The Economy and the Societal Orders and Powers" ("Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mächte") and finally, it seems, "Sociology" ("Soziologie"), in the following: his

3 Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen: J. C .B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck] 1922), and Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, 3 vols. (Tübingen: J. C .B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1920).

Grundriss article); (2) the "material economic cultural sociology,"⁴ the core of which should be sought in the "Economic Ethic of the World Religions" ("Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen"), subtitled 1915 as "Sketches in the Sociology of Religion" ("Religionssoziologische Skizzen"), 1920 as "Comparative Essays in the Sociology of Religion" ("Vergleichende religionssoziologische Versuche"). He originally intended to publish these essays *together* with his Grundriss article. As this was prevented by the outbreak of the First World War, he published them separately from 1915 onward in the *Archive of Social Science and Social Policy* (*Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*). Finally he wanted to publish them as *Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion* (*Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*), in combination with earlier texts, some of them revised, some extended, together with unpublished essays mostly still to be written. He anticipated four volumes to be published in due course. Before he died, he was able to prepare the first volume of this gigantic undertaking for publication. Part of this first volume was the study on Confucianism (and Taoism), which he first had presented in October and

4 This quotation is taken from the "Preface" to the publication of the 1st part of the *Grundriß der Sozialökonomik*, dated June 2nd, 1914. The "Preface" is written by Max Weber. The choice of words "material economic cultural sociology" certainly seems strange. "Material" is indeed comprehensible in this context, as Weber was trying in his Grundriss article to disregard the relationship of economics to the particular elements of cultural content, among which he mentions "literature, art, science etc." (MWG I/22-1, p. 114). What "economic cultural sociology" may be, however, is less clear. It must either be an analysis of culture from an *economic* standpoint, or else a *sociology* of culture. This remarkable conceptual definition could, though, be the expression of Weber's intention of emphasizing the importance of each side of the causal relationship to both his theoretical and historical ponderings, that is to say the economic conditioning of "culture" as much as the cultural conditioning of the economy. More will be said on this later. This would then lead to an economic sociology of literature, an economic sociology of art, etc. However this may be, possible candidates for this "material economic cultural sociology," apart from studies in the sociology of music, which already existed at this stage, include the essays in the economic ethics of world religions. As the footnote of 1915 in the *Archiv* shows, these were obviously alluded to with the rest.

On the "Preface" and other documents relevant to reconstructing the history of the emergence of the major projects, see the compilation of Johannes Winckelmann, *Max Webers hinterlassenes Hauptwerk: Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mächte. Entstehung und gedanklicher Aufbau* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1986), here, p. 165, and for an overall view, Wolfgang Schluchter, *Individualismus, Verantwortungsethik und Vielfalt* (Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2000), pp. 179ff. See also Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Entstehungsgeschichte und Dokumente*, Wolfgang Schluchter (ed.) (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 2009). (MWG I/24).

December 1915 in the Archive (*Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*) in two installments.⁵ But there was to be an enormously extended version in the first volume of the Collected Essays. Like the Grundriss article, which breaks off all too soon, the collection ends prematurely with the revised "Intermediate Reflection," which leads on to Hinduism and Buddhism. Although Weber was quite content with the texts on Hinduism and Buddhism as well as on ancient Judaism as previously published in the Archive, he wanted to revise these texts also. Therefore only the first volume of the Collected Essays, ending with the "Intermediate Reflection," appeared with his authorization.

The first fact to bear in mind is that Weber's "material economic cultural sociology," in which I include the essays in the sociology of religion ("Religionssoziologische Skizzen"), was originally to appear as a supplement to the *Outline of Social Economics* together with his article "The Economy and the Societal Orders and Powers," his Grundriss article. This is shown by the "Preface" to the *Outline* taken in conjunction with the footnote that accompanies the separate publication of the essay in the sociology of religion dealing with Confucianism in October 1915. "The first parts," Weber writes here, are published "unaltered, just as they were written down and read to friends two years ago." And he adds that the essays were originally meant to appear *simultaneously* with his Grundriss article, in order to "interpret and supplement the section on the sociology of religion (though also to be interpreted by the latter on many points)."⁶ This "section," however, was not available to the scholarly public at

5 Max Weber starts the publication of the essays in ancient Judaism in October 1917 with a footnote that deserves attention, clarifying his further plans: "The following presentation (of ancient Judaism, W. S.) is published here omitting the discussion of the Egyptian, Babylonian and Persian conditions. In a future collection and revised publication (for China, provided with source references and revised), in combination with other earlier essays, some of them unpublished, the missing part will be inserted." Cf. *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, vol. 44 (1917/1918), p. 52. As Weber never got as far as to ancient Judaism when compiling the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, the omitted discussion of the Egyptian, Babylonian and Persian conditions still remained unpublished, possibly unwritten. Nevertheless, comparative references to these conditions occur repeatedly in the study itself.

6 *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, vol. 41 (1916), p. 1. Weber used this expression again in the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*. He simply changed "two years ago"

the time. Presumably also written down in 1913,⁷ it considers, under the title "Religious Communities,"⁸ on the one hand the class conditioning of religions, and on the other hand the connection between cultural religion and economic attitudes. Weber had already expounded the latter relationship in his study on ascetic Protestantism. Now he is not only pursuing *both* interrelations, but he also includes all the cultural religions that he considers important, in addition to ascetic Protestantism, Confucianism (and Taoism), Hinduism (and Jainism), Buddhism, Judaism, Early Christianity, Islam and Occidental Christianity. They form the material for defining concepts and for obtaining regularities, "laws," as well as their qualification. As already stated, the outbreak of the war prevented the publication of the Grundriss article and the essays at the same time. The section on "Religious Communities" was left for revision until after the war.⁹ Even during the recasting of the Grundriss article in the years 1919/1920, it remained untouched. While Weber continued to work on his essays from 1916 onward, we may suppose on the basis of the old manuscripts, the sociology of religion section of the Grundriss article remained unaltered. This was not in accordance with his plans, as we learn from the "Preliminary Remarks" ("Vorbemerkung") to the first volume of the Collected Essays, the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, he had submitted for printing. He had still not been able, he writes there, to use the ethnographic-folkloristic material adequately for his approach to the sociology of religion. And he goes on: "I hope to be able to do something [to rectify this omission] during a systematic

to "two years before." Cf. Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1920), p. 237 (hereafter RS I) and MWG I/19, p. 83. Where an edition of Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe is available, quotations are also referenced to this.

7 On this subject, see also the editorial report in MWG I/22-3, pp. 89f.

8 In Marianne Weber's edition of *Economy and Society* this chapter is entitled "'Sociology of Religion (types of organization of religious communities)." See Appendix A.

9 This is not quite true, as Weber got out the manuscript at least once more, to use it as the basis for a lecture at the University of Vienna in the summer term of 1918. This was a sort of probationary term that he had insisted on, to see whether he could accept the invitation to succeed Eugen von Philippovich. Weber then declined this offer. See also MWG I/17, p. 12.

treatment of the sociology of religion."¹⁰ This hope, however, turned out to be in vain.

The sociology of religion contained in the Grundriss article remained in the state of 1913, but the historically oriented essays in the sociology of religion of 1913 were taken further. Thus the two major projects did not develop simultaneously. The knowledge gained in the essays was no longer put to use in the chapter on the sociology of religion in the Grundriss article. Of course, this does not alter the complementarities of the two major projects. One could even say that this made it possible for Max Weber to strive for these complementarities with even greater effectiveness. For while Max Weber was seeking to *broaden* the essays by extending the studies on Protestantism to studies on Confucianism, Taoism, Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism and, via ancient Judaism, on Talmudic Judaism, Early Christianity, Oriental Christianity, Islam and Occidental Christianity, he was endeavouring to *condense* the Grundriss article, on the basis of the pre-war manuscripts and in the light of new insights. How this was to be achieved, we can see from the two editions of the "Sociology of Domination": the pre-war version, in the layout of the *Grundriß der Sozialökonomik*, takes up about 200 pages, while the post-war version as submitted by Weber for printing has been compressed into about 55 pages.¹¹

For the Collected Essays, we are in possession of a plan sent by Weber to his publisher Paul Siebeck (1855-1920) in 1919 and which he followed in the preparation of the first volume. However, we have no comparable plan for the projected new version of the Grundriss article. One thing is clear, though: in his work on the Grundriss article in 1919/1920, Weber no longer adhered to the table of contents of the pre-war version of this article. According to the table of contents of May 1914, the complete analysis was to culminate with the sociology

10 RS I, p. 15.

11 For more details see my introduction to Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Soziologie, 1919-1920* (unvollendet) (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 2013), MWG I/23.

of domination, with which he intended to make the transition from structure to process.¹² This idea is given up in 1919/1920; the sociology of domination is now placed after the economic sociology, but before "Class and Status" and before the sociology of communities, religion, law and the (modern) state, all still to be written. As previously remarked, the revision of the sociology of religion, unlike the sociology of domination, was never carried out. Indeed, with the exception of the remark quoted above, there is also no indication of how he had planned this revision. For the construction of the chapter on religion in the Grundriss article, the only evidence that has come down to us is the table of contents and the manuscripts from the time before the war; for the Collected Essays, the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, on the other hand, a later plan exists. (On this subject, see Appendix A and B.)

Although the development of the two major projects was not simultaneous, their complementarities were conserved. The reason for this is not merely pragmatic, but also methodological. Max Weber's conception of his Grundriss article was meant to achieve a "coherent sociological theory and exposition," as he expressed it in a letter to his publisher Paul Siebeck in December 1913, while the essays in the sociology of religion, written in 1913, were meant as historical investigations. "Theoretical constructions with *illustrative* use of the empirical—*historical* investigation with use of theoretical concepts as the ideal borderline cases," was the way that, as early as 1904, in the essay on objectivity, he had defined the relationship between the theoretical and the historical perspective in

12 In this connection, cf. in particular MWG I/22-2, p. 114. This passage is especially important in clarifying the original objectives of the Grundriss article. Weber expressly emphasizes that what matters to him is "a general analysis, taking the particular only by way of examples." He intended to discuss only the "general *forms* of structure of human communities." And further: "The content-related directions of community action are only taken into consideration insofar as they generate forms of structure which are specific in nature and at the same time economically relevant. The limit thus defined is no doubt extremely fluid, but invariably means that only a few highly universal varieties of community are examined. In what follows, this is done first only with regard to general characteristics, whereas—as we shall see—it will only be possible to discuss their forms of development with some degree of precision at a later stage, in connection with the category of 'domination'."

economics.¹³ This definition is used again in the "Basic Sociological Terms" which serve to introduce the new Grundriss article and are applied in general to the relationship between sociology and historiography: Sociology, he says here, creates type-concepts and seeks for regularities governing events, while historiography, in contrast, aims at "causal analysis and the explanation of *individual* actions, patterns, personalities of *cultural* significance."¹⁴ And for this purpose, one might add, a comprehensive sociological theory should be useful. Nevertheless, Weber does not seek primarily to determine the relationship of disciplines, but to clarify a scientific stance that employs both perspectives, an approach that he himself practised. The study on ascetic Protestantism of 1904/1905 was already an example, as far as he was concerned, of a historical investigation, in particular a religious-historical investigation. The essays in the sociology of religion, written in 1913 and continued from 1915 onward, are the same, although not confined to only one side of the causal chain. This was not yet achieved in the essays on ascetic Protestantism, where Weber had put into brackets, so to speak, the structural and institutional conditions, in order to demonstrate in splendid isolation the impact of religious ideas and ideals on mentalities.

Yet the subtitle, essays in the *sociology* of religion, not in the *history* of religion, which later were even described as comparative essays in the sociology of religion, certainly seems to contradict this interpretation. Is sociology, to Weber, not primarily a generalizing social science? There is no doubt that it is, just as to him economics represent a generalizing social science, both being cultural sciences.¹⁵ But as in economics, this is not denied by the distinction

13 Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen: J. C .B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]), p. 205 (hereafter: WL).

14 Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen: J. C .B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 4th ed., 1956), p. 9 (hereafter: WuG).

15 In the essay on objectivity, it is stated: "If we decide to give the name of 'cultural sciences' to such disciplines as observe the processes of human life from the point of view of their *cultural significance*, then social science in our sense is included in this category." Cf. Max Weber, WL, p. 165. In his lectures at the turn of the century, Weber was already terming economics a social science.

between the theoretical and historical perspective within a single discipline. "Not the '*material*' relationships of '*things*', but the *intellectual* relationships of *problems*," in Weber's words, constitute the foundation of scientific works. On the basis of the "specific *viewpoints*, from which light may be shed on the *meaning* of given cultural elements," disciplines are to be distinguished.¹⁶ Thus the analysis of cultural reality is necessarily one-sided, and this one-sidedness is not only logical, but also pragmatically justified, because the "schooling of the eye to observe the operation of qualitatively similar categories of causes and the constant application of the same conceptual apparatus [provides] all the advantages of the division of labour."¹⁷ But the disciplinary commitment to a specific viewpoint does not invalidate the logical distinction between the theoretical and historical approach. Indeed, for a long time Weber hesitated to characterize his approach as sociological, because he feared that he might be misunderstood as seeking to overcome the necessarily *one-sided* analysis of cultural reality from a *special* viewpoint by a *general* social science which would eliminate this distinction, a position taken by many sociologists of his time. This he considers impossible on logical grounds. For this reason he first expressly acknowledges the fruitfulness of a *socio-economic* analysis of cultural reality. For, to quote the essay on objectivity: "Liberated from the outdated belief that all cultural manifestations can be *deduced* as the product or function of '*material*' interests, we on our part believe, on the contrary, that the *analysis of social manifestations and cultural processes* from the special viewpoint of their *economic* conditioning and consequential scope was a scientific principle of creative fruitfulness and, applied with care and an absence of dogmatism, will remain so for all the foreseeable future."¹⁸ But parallel to this statement, he also

16 Ibid., p. 166.

17 Ibid., p. 170.

18 Ibid., p. 166. In this connection, it should not be forgotten that the purpose of Weber's essay, in addition to the aims of the new *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, was to emphasize continuity with its predecessor, the *Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik*. The latter, however, had "treated the topics that it dealt with as *socio-economic* matters, right from the start." Ibid., p. 161.

wrote a study on the religious conditioning of economic manifestations, examining phenomena which specifically do *not* fall within the compass of an economic viewpoint, even if, in the context of an economic approach, a distinction is made between economic, economically conditioned and economically relevant.¹⁹ For economically relevant phenomena are first and foremost non-economic in nature. And for this reason, Weber is primarily concerned in this study to employ a "conceptual-methodical apparatus" which departs from that of socio-economics, and to present a causal attribution which, in a complicated manner, links hopes of salvation and their religious significance with economic attitudes. Here he also intended to show how ideas can operate in history, specifically as factors of conditioning and not as factors conditioned, the latter being postulated, for example, by historical materialism "as the common denominator in a causal explanation of historical reality."²⁰ But even if we abstain from such a "Weltanschauung" and content ourselves instead with an "economic *interpretation* of history,"²¹ we have still to take the non-economic factors of historical life into consideration. From an economic viewpoint, we are

19 This Weber did, as is known, in his essay on objectivity, though here he was to extend the scope of the socio-economic *approach* beyond the bounds of the permissible. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 162. It immediately becomes clear that this approach in particular is not sufficient to encompass the religious conditioning of such economic manifestations as the 'spirit' of modern capitalism, since for this purpose, to employ a subsequent formulation, seen from the economic viewpoint, the other side of the causal relationship is important. Also, in his distinction between the economic, the economically conditioned and the economically relevant, strictly interpreted, Weber does not speak at all of a socio-economic approach, and thus of the specific *viewpoint* of the analysis, but only of socio-economic *problems*. In my view, it is therefore erroneous, to define Weber's approach in 1904 and thereafter as socio-economic. In reality, even the study on ascetic Protestantism definitely does not fit this designation. For "the processes of daily life, no less than the 'historic' events of high politics, collective and mass manifestations as much as the 'unique' acts of statesmen or individual literary and artistic achievements are simultaneously influenced by [material interests, W. S.], —'economically conditioned.' On the other hand, the totality of all the manifestations and conditions of life of a given historical culture exert an influence on the form of material needs, the way in which they are satisfied, the formation of material interest groups and the type of their power resources and thence on the type of process of 'economic development'—it becomes 'economically relevant'." WL, p. 163. It is also true that the distinction between the economic, the economically conditioned and the economically relevant can be transferred in an analogous way to all value spheres and life orders, and to all the regulations and powers of society. Thus cultural manifestations may be religious, religiously conditioned or religiously relevant.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 166.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 167.

concerned with (rational) action under conditions of material scarcity in the battle with nature and with other people. True, from a religious viewpoint, this is also the concern of many believers, but not this alone. Here the focus is rather on the question of meaning, the question of one's own destiny in the beyond, and the scientific reply to this question requires an interpretation of history which is not only economic, but also "spiritual."²² Sociology is therefore a discipline which, like economics, sheds light on social manifestations and cultural processes from specific, and thereby necessarily one-sided viewpoints, and develops a conceptual-methodical apparatus to this end. This is exactly what Weber does in his Grundriss article. The dominant viewpoint for sociology is the interaction of economic and non-economic factors in different value spheres and life orders: the economy and economic powers in their relation to the other societal orders and powers are at issue, and these relations are to be examined from a theoretical *and* a historical point of view.

This leads me on to my second step. I have given it the heading: "Comparison and Developmental History." How does this heading fit into our deliberations so far?

2. Comparison and Developmental History

First of all, there can be no doubt that the primary purpose of Weber's revised Grundriss article of 1919/1920 is to establish sociological concepts and to determine regularities, "laws" of social life. This is not the case in the studies on the economic ethics of world religions, where sociological concepts and regularities are *applied*. This pronouncement is in no way invalidated by the fact that both the major projects are based to a considerable extent on the same

²² Cf. in this connection WL, pp. 166f. It was not by chance that Weber, in a letter to Rickert, described his procedure in the Protestantism study as a "kind of spiritual construction of modern economics."

material. Indeed, Weber expressly states that sociology draws "its *material*, as paradigms, very largely, though by no means exclusively, from the realities of action which are also relevant from historical viewpoints." It constructs its concepts and seeks rules "above all *also* from the point of view of whether it can thus be of service to the historical causal attribution of manifestations of cultural significance." And he goes on: "As in every generalizing science, the peculiarity of its abstractions dictates that its concepts with respect to the concrete reality of historical fact must be relatively *empty* of content. What it has to offer in exchange is the enhanced *precision* of concepts."²³ In this sense, the three pure types of legitimate domination taken from the revised Grundriss article with respect to the concrete reality of historical rulership are concepts relatively empty of content, while the description of the structure and culture of Chinese patrimonial bureaucracy in the study on Confucianism (and Taoism) is relatively full of content by comparison.

In the Collected Essays, we certainly find passages which serve concept formation rather than their application; the "Preliminary Remarks" ("Vorbemerkung"), the "Introduction" ("Einleitung") or the "Intermediate Reflection" ("Zwischenbetrachtung") come to mind, as these passages all adhere closely to the Grundriss article; in fact they are extracts from the chapter on "Religious Communities."²⁴ They introduce and then lead on to the "causal analysis and explanation of *individual* actions, patterns and personalities of *cultural* significance."²⁵ This is finally also made clear in the "Preliminary Remarks," written in fall 1919, to the Collected Essays. Here it is stated that the whole collection is intended to help to "identify the *specific character* of occidental rationalism, and within it, of modern occidental rationalism, and to

23 Max Weber, WuG, pp. 9f.

24 The "Introduction" and "Intermediate Reflection," in particular, are pre-formulated in the "Religious Communities" section of the Grundriss article of 1913. See Wolfgang Schluchter, *Religion und Lebensführung*, 2 vols (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), here vol. 2, p. 576.

25 WuG, p. 9.

explain its origin."²⁶ Weber requires of himself then, from the point of view of method, a historical investigation in logical terms, undertaken from a sociological viewpoint. The study on ascetic Protestantism had already been just such a historical investigation.

It is certainly not possible to interpret Weber's switch from the theoretical to the historical viewpoint as a lapse into narration in historiography. The Collected Essays are also attempts at a comparative *sociology* of religions, because they not only have a problem of identification to solve (recognition of the specific character of the manifestation), but are also conducted from a sociological viewpoint. Specifically, the concern here is with *both* sides of the causal relationship, as already set out in the chapter on "Religious Communities" of the pre-war Grundriss article: the class conditioning of religion on the one hand, the religious conditioning of economic attitudes on the other. These *two* sides of the causal relationship must be comparatively delineated, but made plain from a historical viewpoint (individualizing, not generalizing concept formation!). To this extent too, the Grundriss article and the essays in the sociology of religion are complementary. The first work pursues these two relationships from a theoretical viewpoint, through generalizing concept formation, the second from a historical one, through individualizing concept formation. And the fact that *both* sides of the causal relationship are now pursued in the "Economic Ethics of World Religions" distinguishes them from the study on ascetic Protestantism, but does not alter their historical calibre. For Weber expressly states that in the study on ascetic Protestantism he only dealt with one side of the causal relationship, the "conditioning of the emergence of an 'economic ethic': the 'ethos' of an economy by the specific content of the religious creed." In the studies on the economic ethics of world religions, however, he deals with *both* sides of the causal relationship, that is to say that he includes also the other side that had been voluntarily left in parentheses in the study on Protestantism. As he formulates it

26 RS I, p. 12.

with all the clarity that could be desired: "The later (with respect to the study on Protestantism, W. S.) essays on the 'Economic Ethics of World Religions' attempt, in an overall view of the relationships of the most important cultural religions to the economy and to social class, to investigate *both* sides of the causal relationship in whatever depth may be necessary to find points of *comparison* with the occidental development still to be analysed."²⁷

Thus Weber certainly did not understate the difference between the studies on ascetic Protestantism—the 1904/1905 study was supplemented in 1920 and now enriched with the almost entirely new essay on the Protestant sects—and the studies on the economic ethics of world religions. This can also be detected with very little difficulty from the "Table of Contents" of the first volume of the Collected Essays. According to this, the "Preliminary Remarks" written in fall 1919 applies to all the essays, i.e. including the revised version of the "Protestant Ethic" and the essay on the "Protestant Sects;" the "Introduction" and "Intermediate Reflection," on the other hand, apply only to the "Economic Ethics of World Religions," notwithstanding the fact that *all* previously published texts were revised. Indeed, the conceptual apparatus that had been developed since 1904/1905 is used throughout; in the essay "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism"—spirit now without quotation marks—, this is especially true of the insertions, which, as elsewhere, are the primary constituent of the revision (see Appendix C).²⁸

The primary function of comparisons is to identify peculiarities, not to explain them.²⁹ Furthermore, they serve to construct sociological concepts. As the construction of concepts is not central to the essays on the economic ethics of

27 Ibid., p. 12.

28 This applies especially to the concepts of asceticism and mysticism.

29 This formulation needs some qualification, however, in that comparisons naturally also play a role in causal attribution, as any experiment with a control group will show. Even though experiments obey the same logic. And it is not by chance that John Stuart Mill recommended the method of differences to the "moral sciences." Nevertheless, comparison and causal attribution are two different things.

world religions, the principal use of comparisons here is to determine the specific characteristics of occidental cultural manifestations. As the above quotation shows, Weber wishes to pursue Asiatic cultural manifestations only insofar as it is necessary "to find points of *comparison* with the occidental development still to be analysed." We could rephrase this: In this way, the decisive differences that require explanation will be identified. Once this has been done, it will be known what "crucial turning points" await clarification. With respect to religious history, it is not only the turning point related to ascetic Protestantism. More relevant are the turning points that arose before and after. The subsequent phenomenon that Weber wanted to examine was the Counter-Reformation. For the preceding turning points, Weber gives the decisive indication in the revised edition of the study on ascetic Protestantism: "That great process in religious history of the *disenchantment* of the world, which started with the prophets of ancient Judaea, and, in combination with Greek scientific thought, rejected all *magical* means of seeking salvation as superstition and sin, reached its conclusion here (in ascetic Protestantism, W. S.)."³⁰

In 1904/1905, in the first version of the study on Protestantism, Weber had not yet spoken of a great process of disenchantment of the world in religious history,³¹ nor of the significance of the "Hellenic intellectual culture" or the "prophets of ancient Judaea." This he includes now in the occidental development

30 Ibid., pp. 94f.

31 Even in the first version of the study on Protestantism, however, Weber draws already attention to the affinity between Palestinian Jewry and English Puritanism, also known with some justification as "English Hebraism," for the latter shows a tendency "to treat the pronouncements of the Bible 'like paragraphs of a book of law'" (Ibid., p. 179), and therefore to disseminate the spirit of "*formal legality*," of "self-righteous, sober legality." Yet this spirit cannot be traced back precisely to the "time of writing of the Old Testament scriptures," but to Jewry, "as it gradually evolved under the influence of many centuries of formalistic-legal and Talmudic education" (Ibid., p. 181). Among the canonical scriptures, he mentioned in this connection only the book of Job, and in the Apocrypha, the book of Ecclesiasticus, thought to date from the beginning of the second century BC. This last, however, is linked to German Pietism, not to English Puritanism (cf. Ibid., pp. 179f.). There is as yet no mention, though, of the creation of the Old Testament, the role of the Levites and the Prophets, or even of voluntary ghetto existence, the pariah-people condition. These links are not established until the second version of the essay.

still to be analysed. Of course, one can comprehend this overall development only by going back to the "creation of the Old Testament." Other important switch yards are, as Weber points out in his study on ancient Judaism, the Pauline mission, the Roman law, "the Roman church resting on the Roman concept of office" and the "medieval order of estates."³²

These cultural manifestations point in one and the same direction: a "*religious ethic of inner worldly conduct* which is highly *rational*, that is to say free from magic and all forms of irrational striving for salvation."³³ Seen from the point of view of religious history, this is a development which deviates from those prevailing in Asia. This becomes clear to Weber in his "extremely superficial tour of the world of Asiatic culture."³⁴ For Asiatic developments are not favourable to the shaping of a religious ethic of rational inner worldly conduct. As Weber formulates it at the end of his tour: "Wherever a higher stratum of intellectual strives to fathom the 'meaning' of the world and its own life by reflection, and—after the failure of this strictly rationalist endeavour—to comprehend this through experience and then raise this experience indirectly by rationalistic means into its consciousness, the way will somehow lead into the silent hidden realm of Indian indefinable mysticism. And where, on the other hand, a higher stratum of intellectuals, rejecting these attempts to flee the world, instead consciously and deliberately finds the highest possible goal of inner fulfilment in the grace and dignity of a beautiful gesture, it will somehow arrive at the Confucian ideal of nobility. But a significant part of all Asiatic intellectual culture is composed of a mingling and interweaving of these two constituents. The concept of merely acting in accordance with the 'challenge of the day' to achieve that relationship with the real world which is at the heart of the whole specifically occidental sense of 'personality,' remains as remote from it as the

32 E.g. the enumeration in RS III, p. 7.

33 Ibid., p. 6.

34 E.g. RS II, p. 363 (MWG I/20, p. 526).

purely impersonal rationalism of the West, which seeks to master the world through practical means by discovering its own impersonal system of laws."³⁵

The occidental development so far analysed and to be further analysed by Weber therefore requires a developmental-historical viewpoint of broad scope. Development means to him neither undirected change nor progress. When Friedrich H. Tenbruck, who otherwise distinguishes pertinently between religious-historical disenchantment and modernization embracing secularization, opines that Weber has thus switched his allegiance to the camp of the classical evolutionists, the misunderstanding could not be more profound.³⁶ Weber espouses no theory of inclusive steps, such as that presented in Hegel's evolutionary model.³⁷ Neither does he simply follow Darwin's theory of evolution, although in terms of logic, he comes close to it. His concept of development is conditionally teleological in form, requiring constructs of value-related ideal types. These are heuristic means for causal attribution. At issue is always a particular developmental history whose reconstruction requires three steps: identification (What is the defining characteristic of a cultural manifestation?), causal attribution (How did this manifestation arise?) and the weighting of causal factors (What weight can be attributed to one causal factor in relation to other causal factors?).³⁸ The first question can only be answered by means of comparisons, the second and third only by counterfactual arguments using the

35 RS II, p. 377 (MWG I/20, pp. 542f.).

36 Friedrich H. Tenbruck, "Das Werk Max Webers," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 27 (1975), pp. 703ff.

37 Cf. for further details the preface to the paperback edition of my book *Die Entstehung des modernen Rationalismus. Eine Analyse von Max Webers Entwicklungsgeschichte des Okzidents* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998), pp. 25ff.

38 The proposition that a consequence can have more than one cause is a commonplace that should not be ascribed to Max Weber. Some Weber interpreters see this "realization" as his greatest achievement. If this were so, it would hardly be worth giving him any attention today. He did indeed have most sophisticated concepts of causality and attribution. To understand this, one need only read his remarks on "objective possibility and adequate causation in the consideration of historical causality," in which, admittedly, he did not achieve absolute clarity. See also WL, pp. 266-290. and Gerhard Wagner and Heinz Zipprian, "The Problem of Reference in Max Weber's Theory of Causal Explanation," *Human Studies*, 9, 1 (March, 1986), pp. 21ff. DOI: 10.1007/BF00142907.

categories of objective possibility and adequate causation, as Weber develops them with reference to von Kries and Radbruch.³⁹ Here he rightly stresses that the problem of weighting in historical processes—the key to judging between adequate causes—can mostly not be settled, or in any case only with difficulty. When all this is borne in mind, it becomes easy to understand why he included the following remark into his plan for the *Collected Essays* in 1919: "The issue everywhere is how to handle the question of what is the foundation of the economic and social *defining characteristic* of the Occident [identification], how it arose [causal attribution], and in particular, how it stands in relation to the development of the religious ethic [weighting of causal factors]."⁴⁰

Thus in his historical investigations, Weber describes the religious *developmental history* of cultures without becoming entangled in the coils of classical evolutionism. His studies on the logic and methodology of the social sciences as cultural sciences aim to separate two pairs of questions: the question of the relevance of a phenomenon from that of its validity, and the question of development from that of progress. For both these distinctions, it was Heinrich Rickert who had laid the logical groundwork.⁴¹ A prerequisite for the first separation is to be able to distinguish between theoretical value relatedness and practical evaluation; the second demands the capacity to distinguish a conditional-teleological construction from a mere sequence of changes on the one hand and from progress on the other. From the point of religious history, there are thus, as Weber sees it, a number of culture-bound developmental histories, each having its own origin, from which, with the passage of time, lines branch out, but also intersect and under certain circumstances even merge: the Confucian-Taoist, the

39 In this connection see WL, pp. 271-277.

40 News bulletin. 11.

41 See Heinrich Rickert, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung. Eine logische Einleitung in die historischen Wissenschaften* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1902), esp. Chapter 4.

Hindu-Buddhist and the "Israelite-Jewish-Christian religious development," of which the Islamic religious development is a later descendant.⁴²

Weber deals with these religious developmental histories asymmetrically. As the quotation cited above makes clear, he is interested in Asia only insofar as it provides points of comparison for the occidental religious development which is to be further analysed. Judaism, Christianity and Islam are indeed used throughout in the *Grundriss* article (together with Confucianism, Hinduism and Buddhism) to serve the comparative viewpoint, based on differences; in the *Collected Essays*, in contrast, they appear primarily in a developmental sequence. Compared with Asia, their internal differences fade into the background, however: the image of the divine that emphasizes the personal, supernatural creator God comes into the fore, not the eternal uncreated order; salvation that must be won through conduct willed by God, not gnosis; the path to salvation that leads through actions and asceticism, not contemplation and mysticism; the salvation-oriented organization that favours the formation of communities, not the individual master-disciple relationship. By these differences—and they are not the only ones—the characteristics of Near-Eastern-Occidental development are defined with respect to Asiatic developments. Their expression, however, was also partly caused by those crucial turning points, that Weber cited at the beginning of his study on ancient Jewry and mentioned above. They determined the *general* direction of Israelite-Jewish-Christian religious development, which he summarized in the notion of the religious disenchantment of the world.

3. Ascetic Protestantism and Confucianism

This formula appears in Weber's writings for the first time in 1913, in the essay "On some Categories of Interpretive Sociology."⁴³ It is applied in the

42 Cf. RS III, p. 2 Fn. and p. 7.

"Introduction" to the studies on the economic ethic of the world religions of October 1915 as well as in the summary of the study on Confucianism in December 1915, which is termed "Result: Confucianism and Puritanism" ("Resultat: Konfuzianismus und Puritanismus") in 1920, and which remained, compared with 1915, virtually unchanged. This "Result" is followed by the "Intermediate Reflexion", providing the transition to the study on Hinduism and Buddhism. In this study, Buddhism in its origin is presented as most outstanding example of a salvation religion in Asia.

Weber distinguishes between cultural religion, salvation religion and world religion.⁴⁴ Not every salvation religion turns into a world religion, and a cultural religion can become a world religion without subscribing to the notion of salvation. The decisive concept is salvation religion, however, because every salvation religion cultivates in its adherents a more or less radical axiological turn. This turn allows the distancing from this world and also from its magical interpretation. Between magic and religion there exists no clear-cut borderline. Every religion is infused with magic. But a salvation religion carries the potential to get rid of it, to promote a religious disenchantment of the world. Therefore, a salvation religion can become a driving force in religious rationalization. And Weber strives at a sociology and typology of religious rationalism, as he points out. There are two yardsticks according to which he interprets the degree of religious rationalization. As he put it in the "Result": "To judge the level of rationalization a religion represents we may use two primary yardsticks which are in many ways interrelated. One is the degree to which the religion has divested itself of magic; the other is the degree to which it has systematically

43 The essay is reprinted in English in an abridged version in Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds.) (Berkeley: University of California Press, [paperback edition], 1978), p. 1375. The essay can be found in full length in WL, p. 427, quotation p. 433.

44 See Wolfgang Schluchter, *Religion und Lebensführung*, vol. 2, pp. 24ff.

unified the relation between God and the world and therewith its own ethical relationship to the world."⁴⁵

Confucianism is not a salvation religion according to Weber. It is even questionable to him whether the term religion can be applied to it at all. He regards Confucianism as an example of a very elaborate mundane social and personal ethic with far-reaching consequences for a rational life conduct, an intellectual enterprise, in which the second yardstick (systematization) is met to a certain degree, but not the first (demagicalization). Although Confucianism did not justify magic, it did not crush it either. Both lived, according to Weber, side by side, so to speak. In this regard, ascetic Protestantism tells us a different story. It represents for Weber the final stage in the "complete elimination of superstition," in "cutting off all trust in magical manipulation" (demagicalization).⁴⁶ It opposed the world with religiously grounded "rational, ethical imperatives" (systematization), which increased the tension to the "irrationalities of the world" to the utmost degree. These tensions are spelled out in detail in the "Intermediate Reflexion." In this text Weber demonstrates at which points a religious ethic of brotherliness—one could add, in contrast to a mundane ethic of self-perfection—will get into conflict with the inner logic of the different value spheres and life orders.

Weber attributes the radical axiological turn, which occurred in different corners of the world at different times, to the notion of salvation. Without this notion, the intrinsic meaning of the world and the adjustment to it would remain untouched in principle. Inner directedness of human conduct in a traditional environment requires a religious underpinning. Strong spiritual forces are needed to avoid the adjustment to the world as it used to be. Weber argues that Confucianism, although an outstanding cultivator, did not provide this spiritual power. It would have been a different story, had Confucianism merged with a true

45 RS I, p. 512 (translation in *Religion of China*, p. 226).

46 Ibid.

salvation religion. But Weber regarded Taoism not as a true salvation religion, and Buddhism was rejected in his view as a viable partner in most periods of Chinese history.

An ethic of intellectuals (Intellektuellenethik) has always its specific limitations, according to Weber. It relies on ongoing education to cultivate a personality, not on a sudden rebirth of the person ("metanoia"), it discourages prophetic movements and it never reaches the uneducated masses. It remains confined to a small educated stratum and does not penetrate the society at large. Surely it is based on achievement rather than on ascription. But the world is not rejected from a transcendental angle; it is rather regarded as the best of all possible worlds, which has to be improved of course, but not radically changed, at least not from scratch.

It is not by accident that Weber mentions the Hellenic man (den Hellenen) in the "Result," who supposedly displays some traits similar to those of the Confucian scholar. This invites a comparison between ancient China and ancient Greece. If we want to elaborate on this remark a little bit, we have to turn to Weber's "Agrarian Condition of Antiquity" ("Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum") of 1908, which is not part of his comparative studies on religion. Here Weber addresses primarily structures and institutions, not ideas and ideals and their impact on mentalities. Nevertheless, such a comparison is instructive indeed.

In the case of Greece the period we should turn to is, in Weber's words, the "'classic' epoch of Hellas, especially Athens."⁴⁷ Here we encounter also an ethic of intellectuals. Here exists also a culture of knowledge with an emphasis on education, carried by the elite separated from the uneducated masses. There are temples and all sort of religious activities, but no unified and organized priesthood that would challenge successfully the position of the educated elite.

47 This is the heading; Weber uses for a chapter in his study on the agrarian conditions of antiquity. See Max Weber, *Zur Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Altertums. Schriften und Reden 1893 bis 1908* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 2006), MWG I/6, p. 508.

Proper knowledge translates into virtue and this is combined with the claim that the knowledgeable and therefore virtuous scholar would also qualify as a ruler. These seem to be striking parallels between the Confucian and the Hellenic elite. But the structural and institutional settings, in which these intellectual elites are situated, are quite different. Empire versus polis, the mannered and court related "gentlemen" versus the free burgher (Bürger) of a self-governed city, the bureaucrat versus the teacher to the public at large; these are some of these differences that come to mind. What Weber diagnoses in the case of the mandarins, however, that they tended to affirm the existing world seems to hold also for most Greek philosophers. Only the merger of Greek philosophy with the Judea-Christian salvation religion, we may surmise, paved the way for a radicalized mode of culturally motivated rejection of the existing world. Greek philosophy alone would never have achieved this radicalization. According to Weber, radicalized world rejection was one of the requirements to overcome the personalist principle. This was never achieved in Imperial China, where the personalist principle even amongst the elites prevailed (involution instead of revolution).

For Weber, Imperial China is a kind of sandwich-society, with a well structured layer on top and an even better structured layer on bottom, but with a layer in between that lacks structure (the court with the bureaucracy, the village with the sibs, and the city with its commercial groups). Of course, China had walled towns from early on, but contrary to the polis and some occidental cities in the medieval ages, these were no autonomous communities with self government. They served as convenient seats for the mandarins and as meeting places for all sorts of economic activities, but did not produce an institutional setting that would challenge permanently the claims of the bureaucracy and the sibs. This is another important point of difference between the constellation in Imperial China and in Greece as well as later in the West.

As mentioned above, Weber aims at a sociology and typology of religious rationalism. Confucianism serves him as an outstanding example of a type of rationalism within the confines of this-worldliness. Using his terminology, one could call it a cultural religion, favouring a rationalism of world adjustment. In stark contrast to Confucianism, ascetic Protestantism is presented as a salvation religion favouring a rationalism of world mastery. But not every salvation religion took this direction. Weber's counterexample amongst the salvation religions is early Buddhism. Here world rejection leads to a rationalism of world flight. This might be one of the reasons, why the merger between Confucianism and Buddhism never really materialized. So we can conclude stating: Although not a religion in the strict sense of the term, classical Confucianism belongs into a sociology and typology of religious rationalism. Without it, although a border case, the attempt to spell out the differences between basic types of religious rationalism—the rationalism of world adjustment, of world flight and of world mastery—would remain incomplete.♦

♦ Responsible editor: Chung-lin Wu (吳忠霖)

Appendix A

Outline of Socio-Economics

Section III, *Economy and Society* was first published in four installments from spring 1921 to fall 1922, then together as the first edition in 1922, subdivided into three parts. Part One was authorized by Max Weber, Part Two and Part Three were composed by Marianne Weber on the basis of manuscripts she found in Max Weber's intellectual estate. In the new edition of MWG, Part One, written in 1919/20 (MWG I/23) is separated from Part Two and Part Three, written between 1910 and 1914 (MWG I/22, 1-5). Part Two, Chapter IV belongs to the old version and was not revised in 1919/20. Marianne Weber's outline of *Economy and Society* is as follows:

Part One:	The Economy and the Societal Orders and Powers
Part Two:	Types of Organization of Communities and Associations
Chapter I:	Economy and Society in General
Chapter II:	Types of Organization of Communities and Associations
Chapter III:	Ethnic Communities
Chapter IV:	Sociology of Religion (types of organization of religious communities)
§ 1.	The Genesis of Religions
§ 2.	Magicians - Priests
§ 3.	Conceptions of the Divine. Religious Ethics. Taboos
§ 4.	The "Prophet"
§ 5.	The Congregation
§ 6.	Sacred Knowledge. Preaching. Cure of Souls
§ 7.	Status, Class and Religion
§ 8.	The Problem of Theodicy
§ 9.	Redemption and Rebirth
§ 10.	The Paths to Redemption and their Influence on Life Conduct
§ 11.	Religious Ethics and "the World"
§ 12.	The Cultural Religions and "the World"
Chapter V:	The Market
Chapter VI:	The Economy and Social Order
Chapter VII:	The Sociology of Law (Economics and Law)
Chapter VIII:	The City
Part Three:	Types of Domination

Appendix B

Max Weber: *Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion* (Plan dated 1919 and its execution)

Vol. 1 was submitted for printing and was proofread by Max Weber. It ends with the "Intermediate Reflection." Marianne Weber decided after Weber's death to present the study on Hinduism and Buddhism as vol. 2 and the study on ancient Judaism as vol. 3. This was not in line with Weber's plan. However, with the exception of the fragment on the Pharisees, she did not find any text that would fit Weber's plan of 1919. Many texts had still to be written. The titles in *italic* indicate these texts.

Vol. 1

	Preliminary Remarks	1920
I.	The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism	1904/05, revised 1920
	I. The Problem	
	II. The Vocational Ethic of Ascetic Protestantism	
II.	The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism	1906 (two versions), revised 1920
III.	The Economic Ethics of World Religions	1915, revised 1920
	Introduction	
	I. Confucianism and Taoism	1915, revised 1920
	I. Sociological Foundations:	
	A. City, Prince and God	
	II. Sociological Foundations:	
	B. The Feudal and Prebendal State	
	III. Sociological Foundations:	
	C. Administration and Agrarian Conditions	
	IV. Sociological Foundations:	
	D. Self-Government, Law and Capitalism	
	V. The Literati	
	VI. The Confucian Life Orientation	
	VII. Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy (Taoism)	
	VIII. Result: Confucianism and Puritanism	
	Intermediate Reflection: Theory of Stages and Directions of the Religious Abnegation of the World	1915, revised 1920
	II. Hinduism and Buddhism	1916-1917
	I. The Hindu Social System	1920 republished
	II. The Orthodox and Heterodox Redemption Teachings of the Indian Intellectuals	(intended revision not carried out)
	III. The Religiosity of Asiatic Sects and Salvation	

Vol. 2

<i>The General Foundations of Occidental Development (and/or: the Development of European Citizenship in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages)</i>	<i>News</i> bulletin of the publishers 25th Oct. 1919, p. 11
<i>Egyptian, Babylonian and Persian Relations (or: Egyptian, Mesopotamian and Zarathustran Religious Ethics)</i>	<i>Archive</i> , vol. 44, booklet 1, Oct. 1917, p. 52 and <i>News</i>
Ancient Judaism I. The Israelite Confederacy and Yahweh II. The Origin of the Jewish Pariah People	1917-1920, 1920 republished (intended revision not carried out)
<i>Supplement: Psalms and the Book of Job</i>	Preface RS III
Appendix: The Pharisees (intellectual estate)	Preface RS III and <i>News</i>

Vol. 3

<i>Talmudic Judaism</i> <i>Early Christianity</i> <i>Oriental Christianity</i> <i>Islam</i>	<i>News</i>
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Vol. 4

<i>The Christianity of the West</i>	<i>News</i>
<p>"The subject throughout is the treatment of the question: on what the social and economic <i>uniqueness</i> of the West is founded, how it arose and especially in what relation it stands to the development of religious ethics."</p>	

Appendix C

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 2009 *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Entstehungsgeschichte und Dokumente*, dargestellt und herausgegeben von Wolfgang Schluchter (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 2009), MWG I/24
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